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ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY VERSUS PUBLIC CHOICE:
THE CASE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ROAD
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
Jonathan Remy Nash†
This Article argues, using the case of responses to traffic congestion, that public
choice provides a greater explanation for the emergence of property rights than
does economic efficiency. While the traditional solution to traffic congestion is to
provide new roadway capacity, that is not an efficient response in that it does not
lead to internalization of costs. Moreover, over time new capacity may serve to
exacerbate congestion problems: New roadway capacity may induce additional
travel that would not have taken place but for the new construction. By contrast,
congestion charges—that is, imposing tolls designed to force drivers to
internalize the costs that their driving imposes on other drivers—offer an
efficient way to address the problem of congestion. The continued popularity,
despite this, of providing new roadway capacity turns upon public choice theory.
New roadway construction tends to be very attractive for politicians as a way to
satisfy both constituents generally, as well as interest groups that tend to be wellorganized and powerful. In contrast, congestion charging regimes tend to be less
popular across the board politically. At present, there appears currently to be
something of a shift in position. Experimentation with congestion pricing
programs is growing overseas—including a notable program in London—and a
serious proposal for New York City’s central business district. This Article thus
argues that, while political economy tends to be a powerful force, it is possible
for concerns of efficiency to override (or at least to curtail) that force when the
inefficiencies of a response grounded in political economy become too large. At
the same time, public choice continues to hold considerable sway: The shift
toward congestion pricing may require not only pressing efficiency concerns, but
also a shift in the political climate, as evidenced by backlash against New York
City’s proposal.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Two stories dominate the current law and economics literature on the emergence and
development of property rights regimes. One is the optimistic story that economic efficiency
drives the definition and resolution of property rights. The second story is grounded in public
choice and is far more pessimistic. On this account, property rights come about when those with
the most power in fact want them to come about. Commentators debate which of these stories, or
perhaps more accurately what combination of them, best explains the development of property
rights regimes in particular settings.
In this Article, I address these questions in the specific setting of the societal response to
traffic congestion. Traffic congestion is a growing problem on the nation’s roads. As land
development continues to consume more and more previously unoccupied land, more people
drive more vehicles greater distances. The result is traffic—lots of it. And lots of traffic has many
deleterious effects for society. There are time delays—for both people and freight. Congestion
also magnifies the environmental impact of driving. And, of late, congestion has come to be
recognized as a source of “road rage.”
Traffic congestion presents an excellent setting in which to gauge the effectiveness of the
competing explanations for the development of property and governance regimes because the two
outcomes toward which each alternative moves differ so clearly. The public choice explanation
leads to the “solution” of expanding roadway capacity, while economic efficiency argues in favor
of more market-based regulatory regimes governing roadway access and usage. In other words,
efficiency argues in favor of greater property rights, while public choice instead advocates
reducing scarcity and thus reducing the demand for property rights.
Because roads are largely supplied to the public-at-large by the government, congestion
tends to be a problem that concerns politicians. The traditional solution to a congestion problem is
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simple: Build more roads. This can mean the addition of new lanes to existing roadways, or it can
mean the construction of entirely new thoroughfares, expressways, and freeways. A more general
formulation of this approach is the provision of new roadway capacity.
New roadway capacity is not an efficient way to address traffic congestion. Even if
congestion is abated, the fact remains that providing roadway capacity fails to address the
fundamental underlying economic problem: the ability of roadway users to externalize costs on
other roadway users and on society at large. The provision of new roadway capacity does not
require or lead to the internalization of costs. As such, it encourages an inefficiently high level of
use of the resource. Neither does new capacity allocate roadway capacity efficiently, to those who
value it most.
Moreover, not only is the generation of new roadway capacity not an efficient way to
address congestion, over time new capacity may serve to exacerbate congestion problems. This is
because of the phenomenon of “induced travel.” Essentially, new roadway capacity may induce
additional travel that would not have taken place but for the new construction.
By contrast, congestion charges offer an efficient way to address the problem of
congestion. As opposed to simple tolls (which tend to be uniformly priced and that are intended
simply to finance the maintenance of the roadway or to augment government coffers), congestion
charges are, simply put, tolls that are designed to force drivers to internalize the congestion costs
that their driving imposes on other drivers. By forcing drivers to internalize at least some of the
negative externality that they impose by using roadways, a system of congestion charges is likely
to reduce roadway usage closer to an efficient level. Also, the use of charges is more likely to
result in the allocation of the resource of roadway usage to those who value it most.
Despite their inferiority in terms of efficiency, the provision of new roadway capacity
remains by far the more popular option. The reason for this can be found by looking to public
choice theory. New roadway construction tends to be very attractive for politicians as a way to
satisfy both constituents generally, as well as interest groups that tend to be well-organized and
powerful. On the other hand, congestion charging regimes—depending upon the setting in which
they are introduced—tend to be less popular across the board politically.
A study the evolution of government responses to traffic congestion provides insight into
which story of the development of property rights regimes—efficiency or public choice—holds
sway under particular circumstances. The fact that providing new roadway capacity remains more
popular suggests the dominance of the public choice explanation for the development of property
rights over the story grounded in efficiency.
At the same time, there appears currently to be something of a shift in position. In recent
years, Congress has authorized pilot congestion charging regimes. Moreover, experimentation
with congestion pricing programs is growing overseas—including a notable program in
London—and a serious proposal for congestion pricing has emerged to govern and reduce traffic
on New York City’s central business district.1 Further, President Bush’s Secretary of
Transportation—Mary Peters—is a strong advocate of congestion pricing.2 This suggests that,
while political economy tends to be a powerful force, it is possible for concerns of efficiency to
override (or at least to curtail) that force when the inefficiencies of a response grounded in
political economy become too large.
1
2

See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text; infra note 234-241 and accompanying text.
See Matthew Wald, Bush Chooses Transportation Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A15.
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Yet, even in the face of weighty efficiency arguments in favor of congestion pricing,
political opposition to such programs remains vital and often successful. First, although it was not
enacted in that form—the fact that, this late date and despite the success of pilot congestion
pricing programs—a bill was considered in the Senate that would have curtailed the pilot
programs shows the continued strength of political opposition to congestion pricing.3 Second,
consider that, even in New York City—a relatively politically homogeneous municipality in
which reliance upon public transit is already well established and far exceeds the national norm—
opposition to congestion pricing remains strong enough to keep congestion pricing proposals
from moving quickly beyond the proposal stage.
Moreover, political economy also offers an explanation for the present shift toward
greater embrace of congestion pricing. The frontiers of congestion pricing—that is, those settings
where congestion pricing seems to be growing fastest—are, other than heavily urbanized areas
where the addition of new roadways is essentially not an option—are settings in which new
roadway construction will be subject to congestion pricing. Such an approach blunts political
opposition to congestion pricing on the ground that it imposes new fees, since existing roadways
remain accessible at no charge. It also draws support from the powerful construction and real
estate industries as well as organized labor—all of which tend to benefit from new road
construction. Finally, the introduction of congestion pricing offers a benefit to a small but
growing constituency—industries that research and manufacture the technologies used to
implement congestion pricing regimes.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I discuss in some greater detail the two
competing economic explanations for the development of property rights. In Part III, I present an
overview of the economics of roadway usage.
In Parts IV and V, I evaluate the provision of new roadway capacity and congestion
charging from the perspectives of efficiency and political economy. I argue that congestion
charges are preferable from an efficiency standpoint, but that the provision of new roadway
capacity is today much more likely to be the political system’s response to congestion problems.
In Part VI, I consider whether a slight movement, of late, toward greater acceptance of congestion
pricing may reflect the ascension of the efficiency story; I use New York City’s recent flirtation
with congestion pricing as a case study. I conclude, however, that the public choice account
continues to have greater explanatory power.
II.

COMPETING ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Commentators have identified two primary reasons for the development of property
rights. One theory is based upon notions of economic efficiency. The other is based upon support
for property rights development on the part of powerful interest groups.4
3

See infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.L. STUD. S421, S423-33 (2002);
Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 278-81 (describing competing theories for
the development of market-based mechanisms to govern environmental resource management: wealth-maximization
theory, based on maximizing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and distribution theory, based upon interest groups and politics);
see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 117, 119-24 (2005) (contrasting the Demsetzian approach with an approach that takes account of the role of
political institutions in the development of property rights).
Saul Levmore characterizes the efficiency story—to which he refers as the “transaction-cost” story—as more
optimistic than the more pessimistic public choice story—to which he refers as the “interest-group” story. See
Levmore, supra, at S432. Thomas Merrill does not seem to afford any greater moral approval to the public choice story
by his use of the monicker “distributional theory.” Merrill explains that, because the efficiency story—to which he
4
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First, building upon the work of Harold Demsetz,5 commentators have argued that
economic efficiency drives the development and evolution of property rights. Economic
efficiency is measured by total wealth maximization—that is, using a Kaldor-Hicks measure of
efficiency. The notion here is that property rights will be introduced to the extent that, and in a
way such that, the benefits derived from delineating and enforcing property rights exceed the
attendant costs. The absence of a property regime (or the absence of a sufficiently mature
property regime) may mean, where a resource is scarce, that societal actors engage in “rent
dissipation”—that is, wasteful activity to try to capture the economic rents associated with the
scarce resource6—and that users of the resource are able to externalize costs on others and thus
artificially keep their own costs down.7 Thus, the introduction of a property regime (or, as
appropriate, the introduction of a more mature property regime) offers the benefit of reducing
these problems. But the implementation (or upgrade) of a property rights regimes has costs as
well, including “the costs of defining property rights, identifying the owners of such rights, and
protecting the rights against interference by others.”8
The efficiency hypothesis claims that a new property regime will be implemented when
the benefits of the new regime outweigh its costs. It also claims that an existing property rights
regime will be dismantled (and perhaps a less mature regime introduced) when the costs of the
regime exceed its benefits.9 These claims make it possible to identify several conditions that will
determine whether, and when, regimes will be created or dismantled: resource scarcity,
externality size, and administration costs. First, as a resource grows scarcer, it is more likely that
a property regime governing the resource will be introduced; conversely, if the resource becomes
more readily available, a property regime becomes less necessary.10 Second, as the externalities
associated with resource use become larger, it becomes more cost-effective to have a property
regime, with a property regime less cost-effective as externalities shrink.11 Third, a reduction in
administrative costs makes a property rights regime more likely; an increase makes one less
likely.12
A second explanation that commentators offer to explain the development of property
rights is grounded upon the theory of public choice.13 In general, public choice theory looks at
government action as the result of a “market for government action.” Under this model,

refers as the “wealth maximization theory”—looks only to overall societal balance between benefits and costs, it cares
only that a surplus of benefits over costs exists, not how that surplus is distributed among societal actors. See Merrill,
supra, at 278-79. Conversely, the public choice story takes into account the distribution of assets—indeed, it may
generate property rights regimes that “fail to maximize societal wealth,” id. at 280—but the distribution that emerges
will not be based (at least not reliably) upon equitable considerations, but rather upon the political power of various
interest groups. See id. (Society “will adopt those regimes whose distributional features are most favorable to the
groups that can organize most effectively to influence the political process.”).
5
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 347 (1967).
6
Merrill, supra note 4, at 278.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See Levmore, supra note 4, at S424-25 (noting that the evolution of property rights is not a one-way street, and
discussing the possibility of property rights regimes devolving).
10
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-8 (describing how greater scarcity of a resource may prompt environmental regulation).
11
See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 5, at 350; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J.L. STUD. 453, 462-63 (2002).
12
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11, at 464 (noting that, “with the invention of barbed wire, . . . [the marginal cost of
delineating property rights] shifts down, and we get more activity in delineating and enforcing rights to grazing areas”).
13
See generally DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
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government actors take steps that are designed to maximize their chances of remaining in power;
for legislators, this means taking actions that maximize their reelection chances.14
The public choice model predicts that government actors will act in response to pressure
brought by interest groups. Interest groups give rise to demand for certain government actions,
and government actors offer supply in the form of support for different government actions.15
Thus, an action is more likely to be taken when it is (i) demanded by more, and more powerful,
interest groups, and (ii) supported by more, and more powerful, government actors. In the
environmental arena, relevant interest groups are likely to be industry actors or groups, and
environmental interest organizations.16
While it retains a focus on the actions and demands of interest groups, public choice
theory does not suggest that government actors will be oblivious to, or act blithely contrary to, the
broadly held wishes of their constituents. Ultimately, for legislators and executives, it is the
electorate who decides whether they will remain in power. The question remains how public
opinion may reach and influence politicians. First, it is conceivable that “voters sometimes
exercise influence in ways that bypass interest groups.”17 Second, public choice theory recognizes
the possibility that public opinion on an issue will be enlisted by “political entrepreneurs.”18
Political entrepreneurs harness latent public sentiment to achieve particular goals—usually seen
as furthering his or own career, though perhaps also furthering the public interest. Note that
representatives of special interest organizations—in the purported public interest or otherwise—
may act as political entrepreneurs in order to use public opinion to further the agenda of the
relevant interest groups.19
14

See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins. 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 325-47 (1998)
(describing such a marketplace for environmental regulation).
16
For the quintessential argument that environmental regulation is the result of a perhaps surprising alliance
between environmental “public interest” organizations and industry, or firms within an industry, see BRUCE YANDLE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 68-79 (1997) (drawing the parallel between the alliance
between Baptists and Bootleggers to produce “Sunday Blue Laws,” and contrasting the “Baptist and Bootlegger” model
with other models of regulation). For an argument that environmental interest organizations act in their own political
and economic self-interest, see Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999). For deeper study of environmental
organizations from the perspective of political economy, see Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists? The Political Economy of
Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. L. REV. 315 (2002).
17
David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 436 (2002). Spence
elucidates:
[P]oliticians can help broader, less wealthy, mass interest groups to overcome [collective action]
disadvantages, particularly in higher-salience policy debates. In debates over the kind of high-salience issues
that produce major regulatory legislation (the kind that establish an agency's general mission), politicians act
as political entrepreneurs, recognizing the political benefits of rallying the unorganized supporters of public
interest policy goals. This is the so-called "republican moment" explanation for major regulatory legislation
Id. (footnote omitted). Note that Spence’s explanation of the phenomenon itself credits politicians as “political
entrepreneurs,” see infra note 18.
18
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86
MICH. L. REV. 930, 976 (1988) (referring to a “political entrepreneur” as one “who hopes to enhance his own career
through the success of an organization with which he is associated, or by serving as a symbol around which diffuse,
nonorganized individuals can coalesce” (footnote omitted)); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 54 (2003) (noting that political entrepreneurs “emerge
when they can advance politically by offering constituents a collective benefit, even where constituents lack sufficient
interest to engage in concerted political action”); cf. William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 271 (2001) (describing political entrepreneurs as “[p]ublic-spirited or perhaps
opportunistic”).
19
See, e.g., Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from
RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 664-66 (2000) (discussing the possible role of industry representatives as
political entrepreneurs to harness public opinion against application to individuals of a Los Angeles metropolitan area
15

Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice

7

The question remains open as to which of these stories—or what combination of them—
most accurately describes the evolution—or devolution, or lack of evolution—of property rights
under which circumstances. In the succeeding Parts, I analyze this question in the context of
property rights in roadway access. It turns out that one response to traffic congestion—congestion
pricing—is favored under the efficiency story, while another response—the provision of new
roadway capacity—is favored under the public choice story. Because the congestion pricing
solution is a property-based solution while new roadway capacity (which purports to solve the
problem by providing more of the resource, thus reducing scarcity), the setting of roadway access
is an apt one in which to measure the accuracy of the competing stories at predicting the
evolution of property rights.
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF ROADWAY USAGE

A. Roads as an Open Access Resource
Roads tend to be provided by the government.20 The use of most roads, moreover, is
provided at no charge to individual users; the roads are funded at taxpayer expense.21 Access is
unrestricted.22
trading scheme designed to control nitrogen and sulfur dioxide emissions); Hale E. Sheppard, The NAFTA Trucking
Dispute: Pretexts for Noncompliance and Policy Justifications for U.S. Facilitation of Cross-Border Services, 11
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 235, 254-56 (2002) (noting ulterior motives of unions—in seeking domestic job protection—
in opposing opening the United States to trucks from Mexico under NAFTA by harnessing public opinion against the
idea on the ground that the agreement would compromise public safety); id. at 256 (noting possible ulterior motive of
public interest organization—favoring rails over roads for cargo transportation—for opposing opening the United
States to trucks from Mexico).
20
This was not always the case. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1383 (1993) (“Private
toll roads were in fact familiar features of the early Nineteenth Century American landscape.”); see also FEDERAL
HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, TOLL FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: BRIDGES – TUNNELS – ROADS – FERRIES iii-iv
(June 2003) (available at www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tollpage.htm) (presenting a history of toll roads in the United
States).
For discussion of the reasons for the shift away from privately-owned toll roads, see Richard A. Epstein, The
Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J.L. STUD. S515, S522 (2002) (“The state monopoly [over
highways] is intended to counteract the Balkanization of transportation services that would necessarily arise if
ownership of the highway system were distributed among several private parties, each with the absolute right to
exclude others.”); see generally Ellickson, supra, at 1381-85 (describing, in economic terms, the natural evolution of
government provision of roads); Levmore, supra note 4, at S434-35 (same); but cf. id. at S435-36 (providing an
alternative, interest-group explanation for the provision and ownership of roads). Although roads provide a benefit for
local users, the fact that they also serve a broader societal need suggests that they should be provided by governments
at higher levels than local governments. See Roger Nober, Note, Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation:
Toward a Theory of Public Choice and Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 229, 237 (1990).
Despite history movement away from privately-owned roads, and the traditional justifications for public ownership
of highways, there are some signs of a resurgence in privately-owned highways, at least in some areas of the country.
See, e.g., Patrick Jackson & J.L. Miller, Privatizing Highways: Solution or Setback? Nationwide, Roads Being Leased
with Mixed Results, WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL, Nov. 27, 2005, at 3; Steven Ginsburg, Tolls Soon Could Be Core of
Commute; Express Network Swiftly Taking Form, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2005, at A1 (describing likely construction of
network of express lanes in the metropolitan Washington area, “many of which will be built and operated by private
firms”); Steven Ginsburg, Australian Firm Buys Greenway; Company is Latest to Enter D.C. Market as Privatization
Spreads, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005, at B3 (noting the purchase of a private road in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area by “a major player . . . at a time when officials are considering privatizing many of the region’s roads”).
21
See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 1384 (“Public-finance theorists argue that, once a right-of-way has been
provided, the marginal costs of accommodating an additional traveler on it are close to zero (at least until the road
becomes congested). When this is so, it is socially optimal not to levy tolls. In addition, especially on little traveled
ways, the administrative costs of collecting tolls from trip-takers are usually prohibitive.”); Levmore, supra note 4, at
S434-35 (offering an explanation for government provision of road access at no charge based upon the “expenses
associated with toll collection”). Ellickson anticipated that technological development might facilitate toll collection—
and even the use of discriminatory pricing. See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 1384 n.353. And, indeed, such
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At low levels of usage, free roads provided by the government fall within the ambit of
“public goods.”23 The classic definition describes public goods as fulfilling two criteria: jointness
in supply (or nonrival consumption)—meaning that the consumption of the good by one person
does not diminish or otherwise interfere with others’ consumption of the good—and impossibility
of exclusion—meaning that, once the good is in supply, no one can be prevented from consuming
the good.24 Public roads certainly meet the latter criterion: Once a public road is opened, all
members of the public are free to use the road;25 they are an open-access resource.26 And, the use
of the road by relatively few does not diminish or interfere with others’ use of the road.
But the former criterion—jointness in supply—is not met for higher levels of usage:27
The use of the road by large numbers of people may lead to congestion, which will interfere with
people’s consumption of the good. Tirza Wahrman explains:
Congestion is a classic negative externality. As additional road users occupy the
road, the quality of service provided to all users declines. When drivers use a
highway, they do not pay the costs they are imposing on other drivers by adding
to their delay. The only “costs” incurred by the single driver are running costs
and her own time delay. Traffic should flow smoothly at the speed limit. As
traffic increases, however, the eventual addition of one more vehicle will slow
the flow and increase the travel time of other vehicles. At this point, congestion
begins.28

technological evolution has come to pass. See Tirza S. Wahrman, Breaking the Logjam: The Peak Pricing of Congested
Urban Roadways Under the Clean Air Act to Improve Air Quality and Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled, 8 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 181, 196 (1998) (“It is only recently that the concept [of congestion pricing] became administratively
feasible with the introduction of electronic tolls and computerized toll cards.”).
22
See, e.g., 39A C.J.S. Highways § 1 (2003) (“The term ‘highway’ means a way open to all the people without
distinction for passage and repassage at their pleasure . . . .”).
23
Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods,
108 YALE L.J. 377, 377 (1998) (identifying roads as an example of a public good); Emily Sherwin, Epstein’s Property,
19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 697, 700 (2000) (same).
24
E.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 795, 801-02 (1987).
25
Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
813, 838 (2003) (“Roads are an imperfect example of [j]oint [u]se because obeying traffic laws is a condition to their
use. But for the most part, we have decided that transportation is important enough that there should be no exclusions,
which would not be the case if, for example, tolls were imposed to alleviate congestion.”); Mark A. Lemley,
Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (2001) (“Roads . . . have some of the characteristics of a public good: it is
difficult to exclude nonpaying users.”).
26
See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 1381 (noting the important distinction, ignored by Garrett Hardin, between openaccess property that anyone can enter, and limited-access property that is open only to a limited portion of the
populace); Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.L. STUD.
S331, S335 (2002) (noting the same distinction, and observing that it was ignored by Harold Demsetz).
27
See infra Figure 1 (graph depicts the private costs and social costs curve as collinear until a particular threshold
level of trips per hour is reached, indicating that negative externalities do not arise until the threshold level is reached).
Mark Hall and John Colombo explain:
Many services that are said to be public goods do not actually face an absolute indivisibility problem. Instead,
it is merely difficult or uneconomical to assess each consumer's benefit and, therefore, charge him or her
appropriately. For instance, when the government builds a road, it sometimes erects a toll booth to charge the
particular drivers who use the road, suggesting that a private good is involved. It is not impossible to do this
for every road, but in most circumstances this form of revenue collection is less efficient than simply taxing
all residents. Thus, some goods become “public” at one price (or level of production) but not at another.
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1395
(1991).
28
Wahrman, supra note 21, at 196.
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Roads thus do not fall within the definition of a classic public good.29 They are, rather,
“congestible public goods.”30 At higher levels of usage, the road is an open-access resource for
which use by an individual generates negative externalities on other users.31 The externality arises
because of the differential between the costs that individual users see and the actual total costs.
As congestion grows, this differential gets larger, meaning that the congestion externality
worsens.32

B. Roadway Usage and Negative Externalities
The fact that users externalize some of the costs of public roadway usage gives rise to
two problems.33 First, there will likely be an inefficient allocation of the roadway resource. The
resource will probably not be allocated to those who value it most. Second, the level of road
usage is not efficient. Because of the negative externalities, the roadways are overused.
First, the scarce resource of roadway space likely will not be allocated efficiently, to
those who value it most.34 In the absence of any organized top-down system, roadway space will
probably be allocated on the basis of time and effort, according to a “rule of first capture.”35
Maintaining an open-access free roadway is tantamount to distributing a valuable resource with a
29

Börje Johansson and Lars-Göran Mattsson explain ways in which roads fall within, and outside, the definition of
a classic public good. See Börje Johansson & Lars-Göran Mattsson, Principles of Road Pricing, in ROAD PRICING:
THEORY, EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT AND POLICY 7, 9-10 (Börje Johansson & Lars-Göran Mattsson eds., 1995)
[hereinafter ROAD PRICING]. They distinguish between actual use of a road as opposed to a road’s potential capacity.
See id. at 9. Viewed in terms of its capacity, a road “can be appreciated over time as a potential capacity, even by those
individuals who do not use it regularly.” Id.
With respect to use, Johansson and Mattsson explain that “[t]he use of a road is . . . only nonrivalrous within given
bounds”—i.e., to the extent that congestion does not develop. Id. at 10. As such, only “within limits” can “the normal
use of road space . . . be categorised as collective.” Id.
In analyzing a road’s potential capacity, Johansson and Mattsson analogize to a firehouse: Just as “[t]he capacity of
the fire brigade is kept in readiness,” id., the potential capacity of a road highlights its “insurance aspect” or “readiness
feature,” id. Moreover, this “potential value” is “not necessarily rivalrous.” Id. Thus, “road capacity is . . . a public
resource with regard to its insurance properties.” Id.
30
E.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 24, at 802 n.23 (“[G]oods may have ‘public’ characteristics without being
‘pure’ public goods. For instance, congested public goods, like highways or national parks, may exist in which use is
nonrival up to a point, although additional users may reduce the enjoyment of other users.”); John A. Henning, Jr.,
Comment, Mitigating Price Effects with a Housing Linkage Fee, 78 CAL. L. REV. 721, 743 (1990).
31
Even at low levels of roadway usage, driving a vehicle generates pollution that may, in whole or in part, be an
externality. But, to the extent that is the case, the externality is the result of driving, not usage of any particular
roadway. However, congestion itself may exacerbate the amount of pollution generated; the marginal additional
pollution is an externality that results from congestion. See infra Fig. 1. See also Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters
Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 201 (1998) (noting that “traffic congestion and air
pollution are not entirely congruous problems, and so have different solutions”; “[t]rip reduction for the sake of
congestion relief largely takes the form of shifting employee trips out of a narrow peak period”).
32
Timothy Hau elucidates:
[I]magine a motorist entering a road that is initially traffic-free. . . . As more and more vehicles enter the
traffic stream, traffic speed slows, and average travel time increases. However, the cost of an incremental trip
to society – the marginal cost – rises faster than its average (time) cost. If that last trip were to be averted,
travel time savings to other users on the facility would in fact be reaped . . . .
Timothy D. Hau, A Conceptual Framework for Pricing Congestion and Road Damage, in ROAD PRICING, supra note
29, at 57, 58.
33
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 486
(2003) (distinguishing between technological externalities—which impose a “real cost on third parties”—and pecuniary
externalities—which simply “alter[ ] the distribution of wealth,” and noting that congestion “could impose either type
of externality, or both types”).
34
Hsu, supra note 25, at 838 (“[W]hen highways become congested, [j]oint [u]se fails in that allocations of use are
not necessarily made in an economically efficient manner.”).
35
See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 75, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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price cap of zero. When scarce goods are made available at less than their true cost, a shadow
market will develop in some other form of effective currency.36 For example, when a popular
baseball team makes playoff tickets available to the general public, ticket-purchaser lines often
form well in advance of the sale of tickets.37 This suggests that demand for the ticket outstrips
supply, i.e., the tickets are priced below what the standard market would bear, and that, as a
consequence, people are willing to bid time (in place of money) in an effort to garner tickets.38
Similarly, cities often offer street or municipal lot parking at rates far below the rates charged by
private parking facilities (perhaps even free of charge);39 as a consequence, drivers expend
considerable time and effort in searching for available metered or free parking.40 In effect, time
and effort become the primary commodities according to which the resource is allocated. An
appropriate adaptation of the “rule of first capture” prevails.41
In the case of roadways, time, presumably, will be the primary factor in allocating the
resource. People’s demand for roadway space will vary inversely with the time it takes to drive a
mile, since “[a]t some level of congestion, any given driver will choose to avoid dealing with that
congestion, either by choosing an alternative route or mode, changing the departure time of the
trip, selecting a shorter trip to a similar activity, or avoiding the trip entirely.”42 For any given
level of congestion, then, the drivers who gain access to the resource are those who are willing to
accept the drive with that level of congestion.43
But the “rule of first capture,” based as it is on expenditures of time and effort, is not
likely to achieve an efficient allocation of the resource. Economically speaking, each person will
decide how much time to put into searching for an inexpensive parking space based upon the
relative value of the person’s time to the expense of a “full-freight” parking space.44 Thus, an
individual who values an inexpensive parking space more than a second individual may
nevertheless not pursue—and therefore not obtain—an inexpensive parking space if the second
person values her time so much less than first person values his, such that it is economically
rational for the first person, but not the second, to invest considerable time and effort in searching
for an inexpensive parking space.45
In the case of roadways, persons who would pay considerable amounts of money to gain
access to a relatively uncongested roadway in the end may not use the roadway because it is not
36

See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5-6 (1976).
Stephen Lynch, Angels Fans Rally for Playoff Tickets, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 22, 2002, at 1 (“[M]ost of
the [Anaheim Angels’] first-game playoff tickets went to fans who lined up for at least 24 hours.”).
38
Cf. BECKER, supra note 36, at 6 (describing “office waiting time for physicians” as “one component of the full
price of physician services”).
39
Epstein, supra note 20, at S534. Epstein speculates that distributive justice may explain this discrepancy. See id. I
return to this point below, in the context of congestion charging, see infra notes 210-213, 224, and accompanying text.
Some municipalities offer street parking to neighborhood residents for a fixed, relatively inexpensive fee. For a
description of a proposal to introduce such a program in New York City, see John Rosenthal, Give Residents a Place to
Park, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, sec. 4, at 7.
40
See Epstein, supra note 20, at S521-28.
41
See id. at S523-24 (drawing the analogy between the “rule of first capture” in Pierson for foxes, and the
allocation of parking spaces).
42
Lewis M. Fulton, Robert B. Noland, Daniel J. Meszler & John V. Thomas, A Statistical Analysis of Induced
Travel Effects in the U.S. Mid-Atlantic Region, 3 J. TRANSP. & STATISTICS 1, 3 (2000).
43
Drivers might make these decisions on a daily—e.g., what route to take that day and what time to travel—or
overall basis—e.g., where to live. But the overall point remains the same.
44
See BECKER, supra note 36, at 6 (footnote omitted).
45
Conceivably, this situation could be ameliorated through Coasean bargaining, see generally R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), if the first person were able to bargain with the second person, and
purchase the parking space for cash. But the transactions costs are likely to be prohibitively high in most such
circumstances. Cf. infra note 46 (explaining why time-cost is generally not monetizable).
37
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worth the investment of time that road usage requires. Instead, the resource of roadway usage
may go to people who value the resource less, but who also value their time less such that it is
worth it to them to expend their (relatively lower-valued) time to obtain roadway usage. In the
absence of a private market, the time-based allocations will prevail.46 And there is no easy way
for a private market in roadway usage to arise.47
A second effect of the negative externality on roadway usage is that the level of usage
will be inefficiently high. At higher levels of usage where congestion occurs, a road is an openaccess resource for which use by an individual generates negative externalities on other users.
Commentators have identified such a circumstance as potentially subject to a “tragedy of the
commons.”48 The ability to externalize costs on others gives rise to an incentive to overconsume
the resource. Although individuals—and society generally—would be better off if everyone
agreed not to overuse the resource, every individual has an economic incentive to defect and
overconsume the resource.49 Because individual users experience are able to externalize some of
the costs of roadway usage, individuals use the road who would not use the road were they forced
to bear the full, actual costs of their roadway usage.
The critical point is that the costs that an individual roadway user sees (in the absence of
congestion charges or some other method of cost-internalization) is less than the actual, total
societal costs of that user’s usage.50 Economic analysis suggests that an individual who is
considering using a particular roadway will determine whether or not to do so based upon a
balancing of the marginal benefit derived from using the road (as opposed to the other option(s))
against the marginal costs associated with roadway usage. Prospective users can expect to bear
some costs themselves, including travel time, gasoline, oil, and vehicle wear-and-tear.51 But, to
the extent that congestion exists, prospective users can expect to externalize some of their costs
on other users. Thus, we can expect that some users for whom the actual marginal costs of
roadway usage would outweigh the marginal benefits will choose nonetheless to use the road
because of the ability to externalize some costs.
This is depicted in Figure 1. The aggregate demand curve for roadway usage in the
absence of full internalization is represented by curve D as the demand for travel per time interval
as a function of cost (including time). D’s negative slope reflects the fact that, as a general matter,
the more costly it is to drive a given distance, the fewer the number of drivers who will actually
drive (and the shorter the trips they will tend to take); thus, the amount of traffic volume
demanded decreases as the cost of travel increases.52
46

Time-cost is in general not monetizable:
[I]f the [extent of the congestion] queue can be predicted on a daily, weekly, seasonal, or some other basis,
people will recognize this and include it in their decision process. For example, if people feel that a given trip
will take a half hour longer than other times of the day, with all the attendant woes of stop and go travel, they
may conclude that it is not worth going. Congestion in that sense provides its own toll. If everyone knows
that the trip will take a half hour longer, only those will go that value the trip above that. But there is no
option to trade away money for that time. It is gone, and that is that.
ROBERT G. MCGILLIVRAY, ON ROAD CONGESTION THEORY 2-3 (1974).
47
A private market here is even harder to imagine than in the case of parking spots. Commuter meeting zones may
be one example of an attempt in the context of HOV lanes.
48
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
49
The likelihood of the undesirable outcome results from the fact that the tragedy of the commons puts individuals
in a multiple-player prisoner’s dilemma-style game. On the prisoner’s dilemma game generally, and on the relation of
the prisoner’s dilemma to the tragedy of the commons, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C.
PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33-34 (1994).
50
See supra text accompanying note 28.
51
Wahrman, supra note 21, at 197.
52
See supra text accompanying note 42.
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FIGURE 1: Roadway Usage and Congestion
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The curve labeled “APC” represents the average perceived costs to roadway users.53 Even
at low levels of roadway usage—i.e., in the absence of congestion—roadway users experience
some costs.54 But these costs will remain essentially stable (on a per unit basis) until congestion
develops (represented by the relatively flat APC curve to the left of the point fc, where congestion
develops). The presence of congestion increases the costs of driving a given distance: Certainly,
the time required to drive will increase, and it is likely too that the amounts of gasoline and oil
used, and general vehicle wear-and-tear, will increase with the congestion level.55 This is
represented by the upward slope of the APC curve to the right of point fc.
The curve labeled “MC” represents the actual marginal costs to roadway users. The MC
curve is coextensive with the APC curve for points to the left of fc, reflecting the notion that
actual congestion costs equal perceived congestion costs where there is no congestion externality.
The MC curve slopes upward to the right of fc, for the same reasons that the APC curve does:
Congestion leads to longer travel times, increased gasoline and oil usage, and greater vehicle
wear-and-tear. But the MC curve rises more quickly than does the APC curve, since the MC
curve includes the costs that a new driver’s entry has on all drivers.
In the absence of internalization of congestion costs, an equilibrium will be reached at the
point where the APC curve intersects the demand for travel curve. As depicted in Figure 1, then,
the equilibrium will involve a traffic flow of f0 at a unit cost of c0.56 However, if drivers were
forced to internalize congestion costs, the equilibrium that then would obtain would be at the
intersection of the MC curve and the demand for travel curve: There would be traffic flow f* at a

53

Note that this curve, and the “marginal total cost” curve described below, refer only to variable costs of driving,
not the fixed costs (such as automobile ownership). See, e.g., Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 29 tbl. 1.3
(distinguishing between fixed and variable costs in this context).
54
See supra text accompanying note 51.
55
See Wahrman, supra note 21, at 197.
56
See Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 3.
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unit cost of c*. Note, then, that the absence of internalization has the effect of both increasing the
total traffic flow (since f0 > f*) and decreasing the unit cost each driver faces (since c0 < c*).57
In addition to misallocation of the resource and overusage to which the congestion
externality gives rise, the congestion externality also introduces some corollary effects.
Congestion delays people and goods from reaching their destinations, and increases the frequency
of vehicular accidents.58 Congestion also imposes costs on the public-at-large: traffic delays
increase the amount of pollution that a vehicular trip generates.59 One commentator estimates that
“[s]top-and-go driving costs Americans an estimated $168 billion a year,”60 of which “as much as
15%, or $25 billion, falls on the public, in time lost by non-motorists (walkers, cyclists, bus
passengers) and municipal vehicles.”61 Congestion is also a source of road rage, which itself can
lead to accidents and other conflagrations.62 In addition, the artificially low price of driving
(because of the congestion externality) means that government must subsidize mass transit
substantially (i.e., even more than it otherwise would have to) in order to induce people to utilize
mass transit.63 In short, the deleterious effects of congestion on drivers, passengers, and society in
general, are substantial.64
In the next two Parts, I consider two governmental responses to traffic congestion: the
generation of additional roadway capacity and congestion pricing.

57
The figure does not capture the first effect of the negative externality—the inefficient allocation of the resource,
i.e., that the smaller number of vehicle miles in fact used are probably allocated to different sets of drivers.
58
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s
Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1237 (2000); MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 46, at 2 (listing “increased hazard” as a
result of congestion).
59
Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1237.
60
Charles Komanoff, Pollution Taxes for Roadway Transportation, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 121, 129 (1994).
61
Id.
62
Wahrman, supra note 21, at 182; but cf. Robert F. Blomquist, “Road Rage”: A Scary and Tangled CulturalLegal Pastiche, 80 NEB. L. REV. 17, 36-37 (2001) (critiquing Wahrman for ignoring causes of “road rage” other than
traffic congestion). On the general topic of “road rage,” see Blomquist, supra.
63
See Charles J. Goetz, The Revenue Potential of User-Related Charges in State and Local Governments, in
BROAD-BASED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 113, 122-23 (Richard A. Musgrave ed., 1973) (“The relative use of
mass transportation versus private vehicular transportation is clearly affected by the respective prices of the two modes
of transportation. . . . If . . . vehicular traffic is underpriced, excessive traffic-congestion costs may sensibly be avoided
by underpricing the use of mass transportation.”).
64
See, e.g., R.H.M. EMMERINK, INFORMATION AND PRICING IN ROAD TRANSPORTATION 3-4 (1997) ([T]he costs of
congestion are too large to be ignored.”).
Beyond clearly deleterious effects, such as those discussed in the text, congestion may have other unanticipated
effects on behavior. See, e.g., Francine Parnes, Business Travel: Gaining Time and Clients While in the Pilot’s Seat,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at C8 (noting that “many executives, frustrated by delays at commercial airports and on
clogged interstates,” are obtaining pilot licenses and buying private planes in order to “beat the crowds”).
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THE DOMINANT RESPONSE TO TRAFFIC CONGESTION: THE GENERATION OF
ADDITIONAL ROADWAY CAPACITY

In this Part, I consider the dominant governmental response to traffic congestion: the
generation of additional roadway capacity. First, I elucidate ways in which the government might
generate roadway capacity. Second, I explain how generating additional roadway capacity may be
inefficient. Not only may the provision of new roadway capacity not efficiently reduce traffic
congestion, it may under some circumstances worsen it. Third, I discuss how, notwithstanding
new roadway capacity’s efficiency shortcomings, public choice helps to explain its continued
dominance as a governmental response.
Roadway capacity can be increased in different ways. First, the government might
construct an entirely new roadway. Second, the government might construct new lanes on an
existing roadway. Third, the government might convert what previously had served as a
“breakdown lane”—that is, a shoulder lane that was designed to be used as a place to leave
malfunctioning vehicles out of the path of traffic (and perhaps also to allow easy passage for
police and other emergency vehicles)—into a lane usable by ordinary vehicles.65 Fourth, the
government might have lanes that reverse direction depending upon the extent of traffic flow
during different times of day.66 Fifth, the government might dedicate particular lanes to “express
use”—i.e., limited ability to enter into, and leave from, those lanes to the rest of the expressway
and other roads.67
“The traditional instrument to tackle the congestion problem is to build more road
infrastructure.”68 But, for several reasons, the generation of new roadway capacity is not as
attractive an option as it at first might seem. First, to the extent that the new capacity does not
eliminate, but merely ameliorates somewhat, traffic congestion without reducing externalities, the
resource will continue to be overused and not allocated efficiently among users.69 Second, “the
social and environmental consequences of building new roads could be far more severe than the
beneficial effects to motorists.”70 Third, some urban areas are already so developed that it is
“physically impossible to enlarge the existing road infrastructure without undue expense.”71
Fourth, even putting the first two problems to the side, the fundamental justification for
providing new roadway capacity—that it at least ameliorates traffic congestion—is erroneous.
The logic underlying new road construction rests upon the assumption that demand for travel is
65

For example, the Interstate 95-State Route 128 highway in eastern Massachusetts authorizes the use of the
breakdown lane for ordinary traffic from 6:00 to 10:00 a.m. and from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. every day.
66
For example, the Connecticut Avenue artery into Washington features two lanes that reverse direction: During
rush hours, the two lanes go in the direction of heavy traffic flow, while at other times one of the two lanes flows in
each direction. The lower level of New York City’s Queensboro Bridge used to have five lanes, with the middle lane
switching direction during rush hours. (Some years ago the middle lane was eliminated altogether.) Also, the elevated
Queens Midtown Expressway portion of the Long Island Expressway in Queens features a dedicated “bus lane” (open
to commuter buses and taxis with fares) during the morning rush hour. The bus lane uses what is ordinarily one of the
three outbound lanes of the expressway.
67
For example, Chicago’s Dan Ryan Expressway has two express lanes that reverse direction depending upon the
time of day. New Jersey features express lanes on portions of the New Jersey Turnpike (at no additional charge) and on
portions of Interstate 78 (a free road, both for local and express usage).
68
EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 4; accord GAO, SURFACE AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION—DEVELOPING
STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING MOBILITY: A NATIONAL CHALLENGE 40 (2002) (GAO-02-0775).
69
See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
70
EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 4
71
Id. An exception—probably made possible by a great concentration of power, probably unrealizable today—was
Robert Moses’s ability to build roads through existing neighborhoods in New York City. See generally ROBERT A.
CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974).
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essentially a function of demand for economic activities, exogenous to travel capacity, i.e., that
demand for travel is substantially inelastic to the time-cost of travel: “Planners have historically
considered transportation demand as a derived demand for economic activities and have assumed
that travelers will change their behavior as their desire to engage in alternative activities changes
over time.”72 As commentators explain, “This leads to the assertion that capacity increases,
including increases in transit capacity, will be effective in reducing congestion and are needed to
account for exogenous growth in travel.”73 In other words, if travel demand is inelastic in relation
to time-cost of travel, then it stands to reason that new roads will reduce congestion. This notion
is reflected in Figure 2, which presents an inelastic demand curve, D, and two average perceived
cost curves—APC0, the initial average perceived cost of roadway usage, and APC1, the average
perceived cost of roadway usage after new construction. The rightward shift in APC curve from
APC0 to APC1 results in a drop in the cost of travel from c0 to c1, while traffic flow remains
constant at level f.

Unit Cost

FIGURE 2: Roadway Usage under Inelastic Demand
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This result may seem somewhat intuitive. In fact, however, recent research findings
suggest that it is not the case at all. This is because of the phenomenon of “induced travel.”
Induced travel is the notion that new road construction spurs new demand for travel, such
that in the end congestion on the newly expanded road system is no better, and indeed perhaps
even worse, than it was before.74 Lewis Fulton, Robert Noland, Daniel Meszler, and John Thomas
conducted a study on vehicle miles traveled in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States. Their
data analysis indicates “a significant relationship between the level of highway capacity . . . and
the level of travel.”75

72

Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 2; accord Robert B.. Noland & William A. Cowart, Analysis of Metropolitan
Highway Capacity and the Growth in Vehicle Miles of Travel, 27 TRANSP. 363, 364 (2000).
73
Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 2.
74
Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 2.
The legal academic literature has taken limited notice of induced travel demand. See Salvatore Massa, Surface
Freight Transportation: Accounting for Subsidies in a “Free Market”, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 331 (20002001); Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth
Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 266 n.64 (2000); Gilbert Paul Verbit, The Urban Transportation
Problem, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 368, 390 (1975).
75
Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 13. The study measures highway capacity in lane-miles and level of travel in daily
vehicle-miles traveled. Id.
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The model described above (and depicted in Figure 2) failed to take into account the
“induced travel” phenomenon because that model took a static view: It assumed that the total
number of vehicle miles would not change simply upon the construction of new roadways.
Instead, as Figure 1 indicated, the demand for travel is probably downward sloping. As such, a
rightward shift in the roadway supply curve resulting from new road construction instead should
have the effect indicated in Figure 3: While the cost of travel does decrease—from c0 to c1—the
decrease will not be as large as it would be if in fact demand for travel were substantially inelastic
to roadway supply. Moreover, unlike Figure 2, Figure 3 predicts that new road construction
should result in an increase in traffic flow, from f0 to f1.

FIGURE 3
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The phenomenon of induced travel has an even more pronounced effect over time. Logic
suggests that new roadway construction might spur new land development—leading, for
example, to more commuters or more businesses to which existing residents commute—and also
might create incentives for current residents to purchase additional vehicles. In short, “long term
responses to increased access can result in changes in land use patterns, possibly inducing both
more and longer trips.”76 This could result in an upward shift in the travel demand curve over
time, as reflected in Figure 4. With equilibrium now occurring at the intersection of average
perceived cost APC1 and demand curve D2, some of the original reduction in cost of travel (from
c0 to c1) are lost as the time-cost rises to c2. Further, traffic flow rises again, this time to level f2.

76

Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 3. On the links between land use, roadways, and congestion, see generally Rachel
Weinberger, The High Cost of Free Freeways, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 475 (2007).
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FIGURE 4
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Moreover, depending upon the time-elasticity of demand to roadway capacity, the effect
of induced travel could be even worse. Let’s say that, as reflected in Figure 5, induced travel over
time shifts the demand curve not to D2, but rather to D3. Now, not only has traffic flow increased
to f3, well above the original f0 level, but also the cost of travel is c3—higher than the c0 level that
obtained before the new construction. In other words, congestion itself has worsened as a result of
the new construction.

FIGURE 5
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It is conceivable that the increase in growth that follows road construction is not the
result of road construction. It is possible that the growth would have occurred anyway. If that is
so, then the new road construction was simply an accurate anticipation of the growth—in which
case society is better off with the new construction than it would be without it (since the growth
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would have happened either way). But, although they are not conclusive, recent empirical studies
generally suggest otherwise.77
In sum, the phenomenon of induced travel appears to be an empirically accurate
description of the response to new road construction: increased travel demand. As such, new road
construction as a pure strategy in response to congestion seems questionable. And, depending
upon the extent of elasticity of travel demand to roadway supply, such a pure strategy well may
be quite ill advised—since it may function only to worsen the congestion problem over time.
Even if new road construction is not a cost-effective way to address the problem of traffic
congestion, it still remains a popular government response to the problem of congestion. Part of
the popularity of the new road construction strategy may be due to urban planners’ erroneous
belief that demand for travel was substantially inelastic to the time-cost of travel.78 But public
choice theory offers another—seemingly stronger—reason for government’s emphasis on new
road construction.
Many societal actors—and, in particular, many societal actors who readily can form
cohesive, power interest groups—are likely to support new road construction. First, even if
economic theory suggests that new road construction may not be effective to combat congestion
(and indeed even may worsen it), the fact remains that residents of an area that rely on a
congested roadway for their travel needs will believe that the new construction will reduce
congestion. Second, industry actors that engage in road construction, and real estate construction,
will support such projects.79 The same is true for those employed in the road and real estate
construction industries. And, since many of those employees are union members, organized labor
is likely to support new road construction.
In addition, new road construction is likely to be a financial boon to landowners,
businesses, and developers. For example, the construction of an entirely new road is likely to
increase land values along the path of the new road. This will likely lead to increased profits for
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See Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 13 (noting that study results “[o]verall . . . provide a strong indication that
growth in lane-miles is exogenous and therefore causes the growth in [vehicle-miles traveled]”); Robert B. Noland &
William A. Cowart, Analysis of Metropolitan Highway Capacity and the Growth in Vehicle Miles of Travel, 27
TRANSP. 363, 387 (2000) (study results “are highly suggestive of a causal linkage” between lane mile additions and
growth in vehicle-miles traveled); Robert B. Noland, Relationships Between Highway Capacity and Induced Vehicle
Travel, 35 TRANSP. RES. PART A 47, 70 (2001) (study results suggests “[o]verall . . . that . . . the induced travel effect is
accounting for a quarter of . . . growth” in vehicle-miles traveled); cf. James Traub, Harvard Radical, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Aug. 24, 2003, at 28, 32 (describing Harvard President and economist Lawrence Summers’ childhood
recollection that, “if the family . . . was stuck in traffic, one of his parents [both of whom were economists] might ask,
‘If there was one more lane, would that eliminate the traffic jam or simply increase the number of drivers who used the
road?’”). But see Patricia L. Mokhtarian, Francisco J. Samaniego, Robert H. Shumway & Neil H. Willits, Revisiting the
Notion of Induced Traffic Through a Matched-Pairs Study, 29 TRANSP. 193, 199, 214 (2002) (using “matched-pairs”
technique (i.e., “comparing traffic growth on improved segments against growth on ‘similar’ unimproved (control)
segments,” and “finding no evidence of induced [travel] demand”). That travel demand depends upon cost is
demonstrated by the increase in New York City bus ridership following introduction of free transfers to buses from the
subways. See Thomas J. Lueck, New York Bus Ridership Surges After Long Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at A2
(identifying discounts as one reason for the surge in bus ridership).
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See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text, and Fig. 2.
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Cf. William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 57, 80 (1999) (“Real estate and transportation construction interests have substantial monetary incentives to
favor continued government expenditures on the highways . . . that are essential to urban sprawl.”); Oliver Houck,
Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 897-98 (2002) (describing the large industrial interests reliant upon heavy
usage of the automobile).
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business owners located along the new road, and also likely create work for land developers.80
The same is likely to be true (though perhaps to a lesser degree) for the addition of new lanes to
an existing roadway.
Some societal actors may be opposed to a particular road construction project. For
example, business owners along a trafficked highway may oppose the construction of an
alternative highway route for fear that the reduction in traffic on the existing route will translate
into lost profits.81 Environmental organizations and organizations that advocate land use planning
also may oppose new road construction. But it seems likely that in many cases public choice
theory would predict that the many powerful, well-organized special interests that support new
road construction would far outweigh the few that oppose it.
Government actors are also likely to support new road construction projects. New road
construction has been described as the quintessential form of political pork.82 Politicians can
increase their power base by doling out road construction projects.83 The public is also likely to
appreciate the public spending as a boost to the local economy (especially if, as is often the case,
the money used to finance the project is from a government level far removed from the local,
especially the federal government). And, to the extent that, as noted above, constituents
understand (even if erroneously) new road construction to ameliorate congestion, politicians can
claim that they are doing something to address the problem of traffic congestion.
When examined through the lens of David Mayhew’s reelection-focused approach to
political actors,84 the propensity for government to back new road construction becomes even
clearer. Mayhew argues that legislators are career politicians motivated substantially by a desire
to be repeatedly reelected.85 Accordingly, he argues, “congressmen must constantly engage in
activities related to reelection.”86 Among the activities that Mayhew identifies that further
reelection prospects—and in which legislators therefore reasonably should be expected to
engage—is “credit claiming,” i.e., “acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or
actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do
something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable.”87
Mayhew expounds that legislators most prevalently engage in credit claiming by doling
out “particularized benefits,” which satisfy these conditions:
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See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, In Rural Areas, Interstates Build Their Own Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2001, at

A1.
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This opposition may be tempered somewhat by the fact that the reduction in congestion on the original route may
actually encourage some people to travel to, and patronize, the existing businesses.
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See, e.g., Robert Jay Dilger, TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Politics, and American Federalism, 28
PUBLIUS 49, 50 (1998); Michael Lyons, Political Self-Interest and U.S. Environmental Policy, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J.
271, 284 (1999); David H. Rosenbloom, 1946: Framing a Lasting Congressional Response to the Administrative State,
50 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 187 (1998).
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As Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum commented during the Senate debate over the then-pending SAFETEA
highway bill, “Never get between a congressman and asphalt, because you will always get run over.” Christopher Lee,
Highway Bill Passes Senate, Faces Opposition From Bush, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2004, at A4.
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See MAYHEW, supra note 14.
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See id. at 14-17.
Mayhew formally restricts his argument to federal legislators, see id. at 13, 25, but his arguments in this regard
readily translates in at least a fairly robust form to the setting of state and even local legislators today.
86
Id. at 49.
87
Id. at 52-53. Mayhew identifies two other activities that are likely to lead to reelection: “advertising,” see id. at
49, and “position taking,” see id. at 61.
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(1) Each benefit is given out to a specific individual, group, or geographical
constituency, the recipient unit being of a scale that allows a single congressman
to be recognized (by relevant political actors and other congressmen) as the
claimant for the benefit (other congressmen being perceived as indifferent or
hostile). (2) Each benefit is given out in apparently ad hoc fashion (unlike, say,
social security checks) with a congressman apparently having a hand in the
allocation.88
Roadway construction projects provide a clear example of a particularized benefit. A
roadway project benefits (or at least appears to benefit) specific individuals—both residents who
believe that traffic congestion woes will be lessened, and road construction firms and workers, as
well as the real estate construction and sales industries. And, since roadway construction projects
are hardly handed out like social security checks, legislators credibly can claim (where
appropriate) that they had a hand in their allocation. In short, the political popularity of highway
construction projects is not surprising.
In the end, the pure strategy of new road construction is not to be a cost-effective way to
address the problem of traffic congestion; indeed, it may even be counterproductive in the long
run. Nonetheless, public choice theory suggests that it is likely to remain a popular government
response to the problem.
V.

THE EFFICIENT RESPONSE TO TRAFFIC CONGESTION: CONGESTION PRICING

Congestion pricing is an efficient, market-based response to the problem of traffic
congestion.89 In this Part, I present an overview of congestion pricing. First, I briefly summarize
88

Id. at 54.
Market-based approaches to congestion control effectively assign a price to roadway access, and then rely upon
prospective users to decide whether or not to pay the price and access the road. In this way, the scarce resource is
allocated to those who value it most. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 714-15 (1999).
There are two possible market-based approaches other than congestion pricing. First, the converse of congestion
pricing is a system that subsidizes travel during less congested periods: “The subsidy acts as a negative tax because
failing to abate means incurring the cost of forgoing the subsidy.” Id. at 726. As such, “[s]ubsidies can in principle
achieve cost-effective abatement.” Id.
The Maryland Transportation Authority experimented with a subsidy-based approach to traffic congestion in 2003.
The Authority proposed “to ease Friday afternoon backups for beachgoers at the Chesapeake Bay Bridge by getting
private businesses to pay the tolls from 7 p.m. Fridays until 7 a.m. Saturdays.” Metro: No Takers for Tolls-for-Ads
Plan, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at B3. In exchange for the toll payments, a sponsoring business was offered the
chance to “advertise[ ] at toll plazas, tollbooths and state traffic Web sites.” Id. Ultimately, only another branch of state
government—the lottery agency—undertook sponsorship. See id.; Travel – Coming and Going: Road Trips Drive
Time, WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at P1 (noting that free eastbound passage across the bridge was to be available July
4th, “courtesy of the Maryland Lottery”); Christian Davenport & Anita Huslin, Arundel Notebook: By All Means, Keep
Traffic Moving, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at T2.
A more encompassing traffic subsidy proposal, also in the Washington metropolitan area, is one designed to reduce
traffic across the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. The bridge, which spans the Potomac between Virginia and Washington,
serves a major commuter artery. Under the program, dubbed “BridgeBucks,” participants will receive compensation for
not taking the bridge. Steven Ginsburg, Plan to Pay Motorists to Get Off Bridge: Wilson Officials Hope to Ease Jams,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2004, at B1. To be eligible, “drivers must pass through part of the project corridor as they
commute to work or school.” Id. Each participant will receive “the equivalent of $50 a month in the form of Metro
passes or bus passes, or the money will be sent directly to vanpool operators to subsidize the riders’ fares.” Id. The
program, which will last for at least one year, will be open to “the first 1,000 commuters who qualify, 500 from
Virginia and 500 from Maryland,” and will involve “a first-year cost of about $745,000.” Id.
Subsidy options are generally disfavored insofar as it seems normatively preferable to charge actors for engaging in
an activity that imposes costs on others, rather than to pay actors not to engage in the activity. See Wiener, supra, at
726. Analogizing to the setting of environmental law, a subsidy-based approach runs afoul of the “polluter pays”
89
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the theoretical and practical history of congestion pricing. Second, I describe in the abstract the
logic underlying a congestion charge system, and describe in the abstract how such systems can
be structured; I identify two axes along which congestion pricing schemes might be categorized,
and thus develop a typology of congestion pricing regimes. Next, I describe the current, limited
federal role in fostering congestion pricing regimes. I then briefly survey existing congestion
pricing regimes, both domestic and foreign.
A. Brief History
Problems of congestion in transportation were the subject of study of early neoclassical
economists, seeking to shed light on the problem of market failure.90 Arsène Jules Étienne Dupuit
undertook to determine the optimal toll for a bridge in 1844.91 The problem of roadway congested
was investigated by both Arthur Cecil Pigou92 and Frank Knight93 in the 1920s. Both these
“spiritual fathers of road pricing”94 recommended that drivers internalize the external congestion
costs that they road usage imposed. Frank Plumpton Ramsey also advocated the use of taxes to
address road congestion in 1927.95
If Pigou and Knight are the “spiritual fathers” of congestion pricing, then Nobel Laureate
William Vickrey was “the pioneer in [its] practical application.”96 Vickrey first suggested

principle, a normative notion that urges that pollution costs be borne by those who generate the pollution and associated
harm. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and
the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 467-80 (2000) (discussing and analyzing various
interpretations of the principle); cf. Kenneth J. Button & Erik T. Verhoef, Introduction, in ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC
CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES OF EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL FEASIBILITY 3, at 4 (Kenneth J. Button & Erik
T. Verhoef eds., 1998) [hereinafter “ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT”] (noting that
environmental law’s “polluter pays principle” has its origins in early treatments of congestion pricing). Given the
additional fact of the Maryland program’s inability to attract a sponsor other than another government agency, the
future for noncongestion subsidy programs does not seem bright. But cf. supra text accompanying note 149 (describing
FAIR lanes regimes as a hybrid between a congestion charge and subsidy system).
One might also think of a third possible market-based response to the congestion problem: a tradable roadway
access permit regime. See infra note 211 (describing a proposal that is somewhat similar to such a system). Congestion
pricing is a price-control mechanism; the price-control analog to the congestion pricing would be a transferable road
access permit system. Assuming similar instrument structure, that the market functions frictionlessly, and that the
government’s access to information is perfect, both regimes should give rise to the same level of pollution and impose
the same cost on polluters. See Wiener, supra, at 715.
Four problems present design challenges for the implementation of a tradable roadway access permit regime. First,
because a tradable roadway access permit scheme would cap the total number of vehicles allowed on a given road at a
given time, it is possible that some people will simply be unable to purchase roadway access; at least with a congestion
pricing scheme, newcomers have the option of paying the charge (even if it is high) and gaining access. Second, for
what period of time would a roadway access permit remain valid? Third, where, how, and at what degree of difficulty
and cost would people trade the permits? Fourth, how would the system be designed to confront the possibility of
traffic “hot spots?” Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable
Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 580 (2001) (discussing “hot spots”
in the context of pollution).
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Button & Verhoef, supra note 89, at 4.
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J. Dupuit, On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works, ANNALES DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES (vol. 8, 2d
ser.) (1844), reprinted in TRANSPORT: SELECTED READINGS (D. Munby ed., 1968).
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See A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 163 (1920).
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See F. H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582 (1924).
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Button & Verhoef, Introduction, supra note 89, at 4.
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See F. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 59 (1927).
96
Richard Arnott, Pricing Urban Transportation: Introduction, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS: SELECTED PAPERS BY
WILLIAM VICKREY 271, 271 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 1994). See also Wahrman, supra note 21, at 181 n.* (article
dedicated to Vickrey, “an early and lonely champion of congestion pricing”).
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congestion pricing in a study commissioned to revamp the New York City subway system.97 He
then recommended the use of congestion pricing in the Washington, D.C. area,98 testifying before
Congress on the matter in 1958.99 In the ensuing decades, he would write numerous articles
advocating the use of congestion pricing regimes, and explaining how they could practically be
implemented.100
Despite Vickrey’s longstanding and strenuous support, congestion pricing remained a
theoretical construct for many years. The successful implementation of a congestion pricing
program in Singapore in the mid-1970s spurred Congress, finally, in 1990 to authorize pilot
congestion pricing programs in the United States.101 Even now, however, congestion pricing
regimes remain clearly the exception rather than the rule.
B. Fundamental Logic and Typology
Congestion pricing is a species of road pricing. “Road pricing refers to charging for the
direct use of the road.”102 Fees may be placed on road access for a variety reasons—including
recovery of the cost of constructing the road, recovery of the costs of maintaining and upgrading
the road,103 to subsidize mass transportation,104 or simply as a source of government revenue.105
Congestion charging envisions the imposition of fees solely as “an instrument to manage travel
97
See WILLIAM S. VICKREY, THE REVISION OF THE RAPID TRANSIT FARE STRUCTURE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
(1952).
98
See Arnott, supra note 96, at 272.
99
See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1249; Wahrman, supra note 21, at 182 n.5.
100
See, e.g., Arnott, supra note 96, at 272-75.
101
Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1249. I describe the federal role in spurring the development of congestion pricing
regimes below. See infra Part V.C.
102
Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 7. Road pricing itself is a subspecies of the broader category of road
user charges—that is, the “spectrum of methods to collect money from road users, e.g. gasoline and vehicle ownership
taxes.” Id.
103
For example, on the New Jersey Turnpike, “[t]olls for travels between interchanges are determined by the cost of
construction and maintenance between those points.” New Jersey Turnpike Authority, Welcome to the New Jersey
Turnpike: A Brief Tour … 6 (available at www.state.nj.us/turnpike/tpbook.pdf (visited Aug. 30, 2003)); see id. at 9-10
(section entitled “Your Tolls at Work” that describes projects financed by tolls that have been undertaken to improve
the Turnpike).
Note that, effective July 9, 2003, the New Jersey Highway Authority (which administered New Jersey’s Garden
State Parkway) was folded into the New Jersey Turnpike Authority. See N.J. P.L. 2003 c. 79 (May 27, 2003);
www.gspkwy.state.nj.us/ (visited Aug. 30, 2003). A press release from New Jersey’s governor proclaims that, as a
result, “more money is now available for projects to improve the roads.” www.state.nj.us/turnpike/msgfromgov.htm
(visited Aug. 30, 2003).
104
For example, New York’s MTA Bridges and Tunnels (“B&T”) is a “constituent agency of the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority.” MTA, Welcome to MTA Bridges and Tunnels, www.mta.nyc.ny.us/bandt/html/btintro.htm
(visited Dec. 3, 2005). B&T’s “dual role is to operate seven bridges and two tunnels and to provide surplus toll
revenues to help support public transit.” Id. The cross-subsidization of public transit with bridge and tunnel tolls dates
back to the 1960s:
By the 1960s the city was becoming choked by automobile congestion and pollution, and the need to
restore long neglected subway, bus, and commuter rail systems became apparent. Accordingly, in 1968 the
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority was made part of the MTA. Its surplus revenues, previously used to
finance new projects for the automobile, were redirected to public transportation. Since that time, bridge and
tunnel tolls have contributed more than $5.6 billion to subsidize fares and underwrite capital improvements
for New York City Transit, the Long Island Rail Road, and the Metro-North Railroad. Total toll revenues,
more than $750 million annually, and Bridges and Tunnels’ Five Year Capital Program will keep its facilities
among the best maintained in the region.
Id.
105
E.g., MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 46, at 1 (“Through most of history the justification for [toll charges] has been
either to generate income or profit or to pay the costs of providing a facility which smooth[e]s the way for passage.”
(emphasis in original)).
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demand and guide/control traffic flows.” 106 Congestion pricing schemes are generally designed to
mandate the internalization of the congestion externality.107
Congestion pricing regimes seek to remedy the externality of congestion in a
straightforward way—by charging drivers for access to the roadways at issue.108 As I explain
below, this seemingly simply definition harbors considerable ambiguity—ambiguity that affords
freedom in designing congestion pricing schemes—but the fundamental point remains that
congestion pricing regimes seek to mitigate the externality by directly requiring cost
internalization.
The use of congestion pricing regimes for roadway use is similar to the use of peak
pricing regimes with which consumers are already familiar for other goods and services.109 The
benefits of application of peak pricing to roadway access are clear: “Congestion pricing assesses
vehicles for the congestion and the time losses they impose on other roadway users. In doing so,
congestion pricing can dampen and flatten the demand to use roads, thereby reducing the
aggregate loss of drivers’ time and also defraying the need to expand road capacity.”110 In
addition, congestion pricing “not only sends out the right signals to motorists but it yields a
transfer of resources that could be used by the road authority to enhance community welfare.”111
Also, unlike command-and-control approaches,112 congestion pricing regimes afford societal
actors maximum flexibility in determining their travel itineraries.113
Congestion pricing structures can be seen to vary along two axes. First, one must
determine how the price for road access is determined.114 Second, one must examine what other
106
See Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 7-8 (“When road pricing is used as an instrument to manage travel
demand and guide/control traffic flows it is called congestion pricing.”). To the extent that a fee is imposed for more
than one reason, I refer to the fee as a “congestion charge” only to the extent that it is imposed to effect internalization
of the congestion externality.
107
See id. at 8 (“Road pricing is often introduced as a method to internalise the externalities generated by road use,
thereby removing the external effects caused by car drivers. The charges are directed towards the congestion and other
road damage externalities caused by motorists.”).
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See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1235 (concisely defining “congestion pricing” as “an approach that seeks
to decrease congestion by charging motorists tolls that vary based on the levels of traffic congestion at a given time”).
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See id. at 1244; Komanoff, supra note 60, at 132. For a theoretical overview of peak pricing, see W. KIP
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ed.1998).
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Timothy D. Hau, Instruments for Charging Congestion Externalities, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 29, at 223,
224.
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See infra text accompanying note 226.
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Harry Richardson & Chang-Hee Bae explain that the options among which individuals may choose under a
congestion pricing regime include:
no change in travel behavior (that is, paying the charges); increasing travel (because trip times on formerly
congested roads are now reduced); unchanged travel behavior combined with attempts to reduce total
automobile costs (for example, keeping vehicle longer, or replacing it with a cheaper or more fuel-efficient
vehicle); changing travel behavior with the same level of tripmaking (for example, changing trip time, route,
or mode, such as carpools, transit); reduce tripmaking (for example, trip chaining, telecommuting, or simply
traveling less); and changes in location (for example, residence, workplace shopping destination).
Harry W. Richardson & Chang-Hee Christine Bae, The Equity Impacts of Road Congestion Pricing, in ROAD PRICING,
TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 89, at 247, 247-48.
114
Peter Jones breaks the pricing question down into finer distinctions:
1.
Who should be charged?
2.
How much should they pay?
3.
Where should they be charged?
4.
When should they be charged?
5.
How should they be charged?
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options—i.e., substitutes—are available to persons who choose not to pay for road access, and
how those options are priced.
An understanding of how congestion pricing should theoretically be set is not difficult.
As shown in Figure 1 above, the congestion externality arises because of a discrepancy between
the “average perceived costs” faced by motorists and the total “marginal costs” to which driving
gives rise. It is appropriate to impose a congestion charge sufficient to ensure that drivers in fact
take into account the actual total marginal costs. This means that congestion charges should be set
equal to the excess of marginal costs over average perceived costs.115 Since the purpose of
congestion pricing is to internalize the congestion externality, a congestion pricing scheme should
impose no charge where there is no congestion.116 Congestion has a “collective (social) effect”
where “marginal social cost is higher and increases faster than the average individual cost.”117
A pure congestion pricing system would take into account the existing traffic conditions
and how the new entrant’s travel will adversely affect traffic conditions. In theory, then, a
congestion pricing scheme should vary price according to the extent to which, on a going-forward
basis, the new entrant’s driving contributes to congestion. Thus, under the pure approach, the total
cost of a trip should depend upon changing traffic conditions during the trip. There is a practical
problem here: The total cost of the trip could not be determined in advance. But part of the
benefit offered by congestion pricing is that prospective roadway users might consider congestion
cost associated with a trip in advance. In this sense, it is preferable if the congestion pricing
scheme sets a fixed price in advance of the trip.118 Thus, practicality may require sacrifice of
some of the purity of a congestion pricing regime.119
In order to allow for the establishment of a fixed price for a trip, a congestion pricing
scheme can use historical data on traffic patterns to anticipate the externalized cost that one
Peter Jones, Urban Road Pricing: Public Acceptability and Barriers to Implementation, in ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC
CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 89, at 263, 277; see id. at 277-80.
115
See Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 13; Hau, supra note 32, at 58 (“It is th[e] amount of external
congestion cost – or time cost expressed in money terms – that the government ought to charge for. The marginal
external cost is the difference between the (short-run) marginal cost and the average (variable) cost of a trip.”
(emphasis in original; footnote omitted)). But see Komanoff, supra note 60, at 132-33 (arguing that, because “the
objective is not necessarily to eliminate all congestion, but to maximize the net benefits from society’s economic
resources, including not only time but capital invested in roads[,], . . . the “appropriate level of congestion pricing is
probably far less” than total external congestion costs (footnote omitted)); Phil B. Goodwin, Road Pricing or Transport
Planning?, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 29, at 143, 149 (arguing that, while congestion pricing regimes are in general
a good idea, actually imposing internalization of congestion costs might not be optimal).
116
See Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 10-11 (Where “there are no congestion effects . . . there are no
efficiency or welfare arguments” in favor of imposing a charge.); Komanoff, supra note 60, at 132 (“Motorists using
uncongested rural roads would not pay congestion fees.”).
117
Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 11.
118
Note, however, that other variable costs, such as gasoline, oil, and general vehicle wear-and-tear, may vary
considerably depending upon traffic conditions. To that extent, drivers often may be forced to decide whether or not to
undertake a trip (or to use a particular route) without full knowledge of the total cost of the trip.
119
Phil Goodwin explicates:
[T]here is a balance between theoretical purity and practical usefulness. In principle, the road pricing
argument can be extended to show that a vehicle at the front of a queue should be charged more than one at
the back, and that charging rates should vary by the minute, or even [the] second, in response to the
constantly changing intrusiveness of traffic in urban streets. In practice, there is a limit to how finely it is
useful to specify charges – and indeed a strong argument that charges should be predictable, and known to
the motorist before a journey is started. The result is that most road pricing exercises plan some sort of
simplified system where charges vary by period of the day, and by geographical area or part of the network,
but in rather broad bands which therefore necessarily average out some of the potential refinements, and lose
the moral high ground of a theoretical optimum.
Goodwin, supra note 115, at 148.
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would expect the new entrant’s travel to generate. In this sense, setting a congestion charge
presents an easier chore for a regulator than the task of setting a Pigouvian tax in most other
settings.
But reliance upon historical data does not resolve the pricing issue. In order properly to
price a trip, the congestion pricing scheme should take into account some aspect of the traveler’s
journey. There are several ways that this can be achieved. First, the driver somehow might
indicate his anticipated route in advance of his trip120; a problem arises, however, if the driver
changes his or her path en route.
Second, the congestion pricing scheme might use distance traveled as a measure of
contribution to congestion. Such an approach might entail the system recording the locations at
which a driver enters and exits the road subject to pricing, and then pricing the trip according to
that information.121 The approach also could be achieved by having a device that measures actual
distances traveled on the restricted road122; data from that device would be obtained by the
government and used to price the roadway usage.
A third possibility would be to use time spent on a road as a proxy for contribution to
congestion on the road. Here, the system would record the times at which a driver enters and exits
the restricted road.
Each of these possibilities requires the government to obtain data in respect of each
driver’s trip on each occasion that the driver takes a trip. While technological advances make
these possibilities far more feasible than they previously were,123 nonetheless they remain
complex and somewhat costly. Other options exist that are less complex and costly, although they
require sacrifice of accuracy in pricing to achieve those ends.
First, a congestion pricing scheme can be simplified by charging a uniform price for use
of the road—i.e., by charging on a per use basis, without regard to distance traveled or time spent
on the road. To the extent that the pricing system is designed to address congestion, the system
still would take into account somehow the extent to which a new entrant contributes to existing
congestion conditions. Presumably, such a system would charge all drivers the average
congestion price. One might expect, therefore, that drivers of shorter trips would subsidize drivers
of longer trips under such a system, with the possible result that short-trip drivers would avoid the
road and long-trip drivers would overuse it. Such a distortion might result in inefficiently high
120

This would be akin to a “flight plan” filed by a pilot.
Many state toll roads employ pricing systems that, while not congestion pricing schemes, vary tolls according to
the entrance and exit used by drivers. See supra note 103 (discussing the setting of tolls on the New Jersey Turnpike).
122
See KIRAN BHATT, ROAD PRICING TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY (1974). Such a device would be akin to a meter
used by taxicabs in many metropolitan areas.
123
Compare id. at 7-20 (surveying then-existing technological options) and Goetz, supra note 63, at 118
(describing road pricing on trunk highways as “feasible” but pricing city streets as “impractical” “[g]iven the present
technology,” but also noting that “it is not impossible to imagine the development of electronic monitoring devices that
would bring almost-universal road-usage pricing within the realm of practicality”) with Wahrman, supra note 21, at
196 (“It is only recently that the concept [of congestion pricing] became administratively feasible with the introduction
of electronic tolls and computerized toll cards.”); cf. EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 45 (Although “the costs of
implementing and maintaining a congestion-pricing system should not be underestimated,” “recent evidence indicated
that, for high density, highly congested regions, these may be relatively low.”). See also DANIEL H. COLE, PROPERTY
AND POLLUTION ch. 4 (2002) (discussing the relationship between technology capabilities and design and development
of environmental regulatory tools); Nash & Revesz, supra note 89, at 637-50 (describing how computerized pollution
dispersion models and the internet can facilitate more nuanced air pollutant permit trading programs).. For a discussion
of the ethical implications of scientific innovation on environmental policy, see Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation
and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755 (2002).
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congestion levels (at least in the short-term, until pricing caught up with the changed use of the
road). In other words, true pricing might lead to adverse selection of roadway users.
Another simplifying step is to use the time of day as a proxy for congestion conditions,
without regard to what actual congestion conditions are at any given moment.124 The most
common version seen in congestion pricing scheme is simply to price roadway access at a higher
rate during prevalent “rush hours.” For example, the government might charge a higher toll from
6:00 to 10:00 every weekday morning into a city, and from 4:00 to 8:00 every weekday evening
out of the city.125 Indeed, the city might charge no toll in non-peak hours. For example, the city of
London has recently implemented a congestion pricing scheme for permission to drive in the
central city. The scheme imposes a flat fee for access to the central city during the hours of
7:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. on weekdays; no fee is required during other hours.126
The second axis along which congestion pricing schemes can be measured is the
availability, and pricing, of substitutes. It is possible for all viable substitutes for a congestionpriced road to be themselves subject to congestion pricing (or to some other form of tolls); in the
alternative, it is possible for substitute roads (or public transit) to be offered at no cost. This
distinction can be used to divide congestion pricing regimes into two categories: regimes that
charge for access to particular roads or lanes on a road, and regimes that charge for access to a
particular region regardless of the route taken, the latter being known commonly as “cordonpricing” regimes.
The recently enacted congestion pricing regime in London is an example of cordonpricing. Those who choose not to pay for access to the central city during the day have the option
of using public transit—which is less expensive, but not free.127 While some London workers
have complained that their circumstances leave them with no viable substitute to paying the
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The idea of using historical congestion data is a more nuanced version of this simplifying step. See supra text
accompanying notes 118-199.
125
In the public transit context, the “Metrorail” subway system in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area charges
higher fees for travel during morning and evening rush hours. See
www.wmata.com/riding/hours_fares.cfm#Metrorail%20Fares (visited Sept. 19, 2007). William Vickrey originally
advocated congestion pricing for use in public transportation—specifically, the New York City subway system. See
supra text accompanying note 97. Cf. Patrick Healy, Rises in Fares and Costs Give Cabbies Mixed Feelings, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2004, at B3 (“Riders [in taxis] will . . . have to pay a new $1 surcharge from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. weekdays,
a fee intended to draw out more cabs during rush hour.”).
126
Transport for London, Congestion charging . . . where and when does it operate?,
www.cclondon.com/infosearch/dynamicPages/WF_ZoneCheck_W.aspx (visited Sept. 19, 2007). Exemptions and
discounts are available for, among others, residents of the central city, disabled persons, vehicles that seat nine or more,
and alternative fuel vehicles. See Transport for London, Congestion Charging . . . Exemptions and Discounts,
www.cclondon.com/exemptions.shtml (visited Sept. 19, 2007).
On the London congestion charge plan generally, see MARTIN RICHARDS, CONGESTION CHARGING IN LONDON: THE
POLICY AND THE POLITICS (2005).
127
Public transit is also not a perfect substitute for roadway access. See Oren, supra note 31, at 212-31 (discussing
the importance to Americans of driving vehicles, and surveying how that ideal has frustrated attempts to change driving
patterns through behavioral modification).
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central city access fee,128 overall the London plan seems to be faring reasonably well and even
earning some public accolades.129
The alternative to a cordon-pricing regime is the category of regimes for which vehicles
must pay for access to a particular roadway or lanes on a roadway; substitutes—in the form of
alternate roadways or other lanes—are available at no cost (and sometimes, as I discuss below,
even subsidized130). For example, the San Diego I-15 “FasTrak” pricing scheme charges singleoccupant vehicles for access to the road’s express lanes.131 But access to the highway’s local
lanes remains free.
Regimes that fall under this category may further be broken down into subcategories. A
simple example is a regime that charges drivers for access to a particular roadway. Another
simple example is a regime that charges drivers for access to particular lanes on a roadway. Often
these lanes will be “express lanes” that bypass numerous exits, allowing users of the charged
lanes to avoid the additional traffic, and entrance and exit ramps that numerous exits generate.
Along similar lines, access for lanes may be priced where the lanes are designed to avoid areas
along the primary roadway where the free lanes suffer bottleneck conditions.132
A hybridization of lane-access pricing occurs where lane access is also permitted to
particular vehicles on a basis other than cost. An example of this is “HOT lanes” systems.
“HOT” is the acronym for “High Occupancy/Toll.” On HOT lanes, low
occupancy vehicles are charged a toll, while High-Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs)
are allowed to use the lanes free or at a discounted toll rate. HOT lanes create an
additional category of eligibility for people wanting to use HOV lanes. People
can either meet the minimum vehicle passenger requirement, or they can choose
to pay a toll to gain access to the HOV lane.133
The San Diego “FasTrak” system is an example of a HOT lanes regime. Interest in such regimes
is growing.
Yet another variant on lane-pricing access is a “FAIR lanes” regime.
“Fast and Intertwined Regular Lanes” or “FAIR lanes” involves separating
freeway lanes, typically using plastic pylons and striping, into two sections:
“fast” lanes and “regular” lanes. The fast lanes would be electronically tolled
express lanes where tolls may change dynamically to manage demand. In the
128

For example, workers at a London meat market had argued that they ought not to have to pay the congestion toll
“because they come to the market in the middle of the night and go home by midmorning. When their day starts [at]
around 3 a.m., they say, little public transportation is available.” London Institutes Its New Anti-Gridlock Toll; Few
Problems are Reported on First Day, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2003, at A8. The workers contemplated filing
a lawsuit challenging the imposition of the toll, but ultimately agreed not to in return for “assurances given by Ken
Livingstone, the Mayor of London, that he would consider introducing a cheaper rate for drivers on low incomes.” Ben
Webster, Workers Abandon Charge Challenge, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Feb. 22, 2003, at 14.
129
See, e.g., Jill Lawless, Supporters, Foes Agree: London Traffic Fee Works, N.O. TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 18,
2003, at A23.
130
See infra text accompanying notes 134-136 (discussion of “FAIR lanes”).
131
Vehicles with two or more occupants may use the express lanes at no charge.
132
See Federal Highway Administration, Terminology (available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/terminology.htm (last modified Sept. 21, 2005)) (“Queue jumps are roadway
facilities that can be used by drivers paying a toll to bypass points on the transportation network where congestion is
typically severe (colloquially, a ‘bottleneck’).”).
133
Id.
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regular lanes, constricted flow would continue, but drivers with transponders
would be compensated with credits. Credits could be used as toll payments on
days when they choose to use the fast lanes, or as payment for transit, paratransit
or parking at commuter park-and-ride lots in the corridor.134
FAIR lanes thus are a hybrid between pure congestion pricing and subsidy regimes.135 The
incorporation of a subsidy element may provide an opportunity to ameliorate what some perceive
to be equity shortcomings in standard congestion pricing regimes.136
C. Current Federal Role in Fostering Congestion Pricing Regimes
Public money to construct roads comes from the federal government, as well as from
state governments.137 The “federal-aid highway program” (“FAHP”) is the primary federal source
of funds for highway construction.138 It is administered by the Department of Transportation’s
Federal Highway Administration.139 The FAHP is “basically a federally funded state program.”140
“Monies for the federal-aid highway system are provided primarily by the Federal Highway Trust
Fund, fueled by taxes on gasoline, motor vehicles, and automotive parts.”141 The FAHP provides
federal funding to roads within the “federal-aid systems.”142 The two federal-aid systems are the
“Interstate System”143 and the “National Highway System,”144 of which the Interstate System is a
component.145
In fact, the Interstate System constitutes a very small part of all roads—only 4.9 percent
of all federally subsidized roadway miles, and only 1.2 percent of all total roadway miles in the
United States.146 Still, though Interstate Highways may constitute a relatively small proportion of
134

Id.
I discuss the use of subsidies to reduce traffic congestion below, see supra note 89.
136
See infra notes 210-213, 224, and accompanying text (discussing equity in the context of congestion pricing);
see also supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
137
See, e.g., David R. Fiore & John M. Stafford, Intermodal Transportation Planning for the Environment: Social,
Cultural, and Economic Considerations for an Interdisciplinary Solution for Change, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 237, 251 n.36
(1995).
138
Edward V.A. Kussy, Wetland and Floodplain Protection and the Federal-Aid Highway Program, 13 ENVTL. L.
161, 164 (1982). See id. (“Although the FAHP represents a relatively small portion of the total highway construction
effort, it is still of enormous significance. It is one of the largest and most costly federal construction grant programs.”).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Houck, supra note 79, at 897 n.176. See also Fiore & Stafford, supra note 137, at 251 n.36 (1995) (“In FY 1991,
the Federal Highway Trust Fund net receipts for motor fuel constituted more than eighty-eight percent of all revenue
sources. . . . States similarly depend largely on motor fuel receipts for state and federal highway projects that have
matching shares requirements.” (citation omitted)).
142
See 23 U.S.C. § 103(a) (defining the “Federal-aid systems); 47 C.F.R. § 470.103 (same). See also 23 U.S.C.
§ 101(a)(5) (“The term ‘Federal-aid highway’ means a highway eligible for assistance under this chapter other than a
highway classified as a local road or rural minor collector.”); 23 C.F.R. § 470.103 (“Federal aid highways means
highways on the Federal-aid highway systems and all other public roads not classified as local roads or rural minor
collectors.”).
143
For the definition of the “Interstate System,” see 23 U.S.C. § 103(c); 47 C.F.R. § 470.107(a); see also 47 C.F.R.
§ 470.111 (procedures governing the Interstate System). For an overview of the Interstate System, see Federal Highway
Administration, Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, available at
www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.html (visited Dec. 3, 2005).
144
For the definition of the “National Highway System,” see 23 U.S.C. § 103(b); 47 C.F.R. § 470.107(b); see also
47 C.F.R. § 470.113 (procedures governing the National Highway System).
145
23 U.S.C. § 103(b)(2)(A) (defining the National Highway System to include the Interstate System; 47 C.F.R.
§ 470.107(b)(1) (same).
146
As of October 2002, there were 3,981,670 miles of roads in the United States. See Federal Highway
Administration, Public Road Length – 2002: Miles by Ownership and Federal-Aid Highways National Summary
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all roads—and even of all roads in the National Highway System—they represent a far greater
portion of the nation’s transportation road network than their total mileage might suggest. This is
because of the role that the Interstate Highway system is designed to fulfill: Interstate Highways
are to be “located so as . . . to connect by routes, as direct as practicable, the principal
metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers.”147 These well-maintained roads carry an
inordinate amount of traffic for the mileage they represent.
Federal law imposes various restrictions on roads that receive federal funding. Among
them is a restriction on the implementation and maintenance of tolls. The existing structure of
federal law, under Title 23 of the United States Code, is quite hostile to the imposition of tolls—
of any kind—on interstate highways. Section 301 announces a general rule that bars tolls from
roads that are constructed with federal highway funds.148 The section’s caption suggests the
seriousness with which Congress—presumably in response to perceptions of, if not actual, public
opinion—views the subject: “Freedom from tolls.”149
Despite the breadth of its language and the audacity of its caption, section 301 subjects its
toll preclusion rule to the provisions of section 129.150 And that section provides a fairly broad
exception to section 301’s general rule.151 Though it preserves section 301’s general proscription
against tolls with respect to highways constituting part of the interstate system, it otherwise
permits the provision of federal funds for toll roads, and does not disallow the introduction of
tolls on roads receiving federal funding.152 The provision grandfathers in existing toll segments of
the interstate system, allowing for funding for “reconstructing, resurfacing, restoring, and

(available at www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs02/pdf/hm16.pdf) (visited Dec. 3, 2005). Of that, 3,079,758 miles are in
rural areas while 901,912 were in urban areas (183,502 in small urban areas and 718,410 in urbanized areas). Id. Of the
total 3,981,670 miles of roads, only 959,324 miles worth of road—i.e., just over 24 percent of roadway miles—
received FAHP funding. Id. Of those 959,324 subsidized roadway miles, only 161,539—or 16.8 percent—are part of
the National Highway System. Id. The Interstate Highway System consists of 46,748 miles of road, which constitutes
28.9 percent of the National Highway System, only 4.9 percent of all federally subsidized roadway miles, and only 1.2
percent of all total roadway miles in the United States. Id.
By comparison, based on 1979 statistics,
The total mileage of all roads and streets in the United States is 3,957,819. Of these, 3,223,710 miles are in
rural areas, while 693,786 miles are in municipal areas. Of this total mileage, only 824,832 miles (or 21%)
were funded through the FAHP . . . . The interstate system has 42,894 miles, which is 14% of the primary
system, 5% of the federal-aid system, and only 1% of all roads in the United States.
Kussy, supra note 138, at 164 n.5 (citing FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY STATISTICS—1979
(1980)).
147
23 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1)(C)(i). The statute directs that Interstate Highways are also to be located so as to “serve the
national defense,” id. § 103(c)(1)(C)(ii), and so as, “to the maximum extent practicable, to connect at suitable border
points with routes of continental importance in Canada and Mexico,” id. § 103(c)(1)(C)(iii).
148
The provision states: “Except as provided in section 129 of this title with respect to certain toll bridges and toll
tunnels, all highways constructed under the provisions of this title shall be free from tolls of all kinds.” 23 U.S.C.
§ 301.
149
Id.
150
Id. (subjecting the bar against tolls to “section 129 of this title with respect to certain toll bridges and toll
tunnels”).
151
See id. § 129. The exception to the bar against tolls developed over time:
The Federal-aid highway program, when created in 1916, allowed no use of Federal-aid funds on toll
facilities. This position remained unchanged until 1927 when Congress enacted legislation that permitted
Federal-aid highway funding to be used to construct toll bridges and approaches. Subsequent legislation
provided more flexibility on using Federal-aid highway funds for improvements to toll facilities with the last
significant changes being made in 1991 with passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991.
Federal Highway Administration, Federal-Aid Highway Toll Facilities, available at
www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/tollfac.html (visited Dec. 3, 2005).
152
See 23 U.S.C. § 129(a)(1); id. § 129(a)(2)-(5) (setting forth restrictions on funding).
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rehabilitating” such segments.153 As a result, “[a]pproximately 2,900 miles of toll facilities are
included in the 46,730-mile [Interstate] System.”154 But, until 1991, federal law precluded the
introduction of new tolls are the Interstate System.
The first crack in the statutory bar against new Interstate System tolls was introduced by
the 1991 passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act155 (ISTEA). Section
1012(b) of ISTEA, captioned “Congestion Pricing Pilot Program,” directed the Department of
Transportation to “solicit the participation of State and local governments and public authorities
for one or more congestion pricing pilot projects,”156 and authorized the Department to approve
up to five such projects.157 ISTEA further authorized the introduction of new tolls segments on
Interstate Highways in respect of three of the pilot projects.158
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century159 (“TEA-21”) amended ISTEA’s
“congestion pricing pilot project” provisions. First, TEA-21 replaced the moniker “congestion
pricing pilot project” with “value pricing pilot programs.160 On a substantive level, TEA-21
increased the maximum number of value pricing pilot programs from five to fifteen.161 The law
also extended the suspension of sections 129 and 301’s bar against new tolls on Interstate
Highways to apply not just to three pilot programs, but to all of them.162
153

See id. § 129(a)(1)(B).
Although the Interstate System is free of tolls for the most part, Congress decided in 1956 to include
some toll facilities in the System. Generally, these were major toll roads built or planned before Federal
funding for construction of the Interstate System increased significantly in 1956. Inclusion of these toll roads
in the Interstate System enhanced connectivity without having to build competing free routes in the same
transportation corridors. Additionally, including these toll segments freed highway user tax revenues to
develop other non-toll segments of the System sooner.
Federal Highway Administration, supra note 151.
154
Federal Highway Administration, supra note 151. For a catalog of toll and non-toll roads, bridges, tunnels, and
ferries in the United States, see FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 20. For a list of toll bridges and
tunnels that are part of the interstate highway system, see id. at 3. For a list of toll bridges and tunnels outside the
interstate highway system, see id. at 4-8. For a list of toll roads that are part of the interstate highway system, see id. at
9-12. For a list of toll roads outside the interstate highway system, see id. at 13-16.
155
Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (Dec. 18, 1991) (codified, as amended, at 23 U.S.C. §§ 100-501).
156
ISTEA § 1012(b)(1), 105 Stat. at 1938.
157
Id. (“The Secretary [of Transportation] may enter into cooperative agreements with as many as 5 . . . State or
local governments or public authorities to establish, maintain, and monitor congestion pricing projects.”).
158
Id. § 1012(b)(4), 105 Stat. at 1938 (“Notwithstanding section 129 and 301 of title 23, United States Code, the
Secretary [of Transportation] shall allow the use of tolls on the Interstate System as part of a pilot program under this
section, but not on more than 3 of such programs.” (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 149 note).); see also id. § 1012(b)(2), 105
Stat. at 1938 (“Notwithstanding section 129 of title 23, United States Code, the Federal share payable for such [pilot]
programs shall be 80 percent.”).
159
Pub. L. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (June 9, 1998).
160
TEA-21 § 1216(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii), 112 Stat. at 211 (“Section 1012(b) of [ISTEA] . . . is amended . . . (B) in
paragraph (1)—(i) by striking ‘congestion’ each place it appears and inserting ‘value’; and (ii) by striking ‘projects’
each time it appears and inserting ‘programs’ . . . .”); see also id. § 1216(a)(1)(A), 112 Stat. at 211 (changing the
subsection 1012(b)’s heading from “CONGESTION PRICING PILOT PROGRAM” to “VALUE PRICING PILOT
PROGRAM”);
Office
of
Transportation
Policy
Studies,
Value
Pricing
Pilot
Program,
www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/valuepricing.htm (last modified Mar. 14, 2006) (The Value Pricing Pilot Program
“replaces the Congestion Pricing Pilot Program that was authorized by the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991.”).
161
TEA-21 § 1216(a)(2), 112 Stat. at 211 (“Section 1012(b)(1) of [ISTEA] is amended in the second sentence by
striking ‘5’ and inserting ‘15’.”).
162
Id. § 1216(a)(4), 112 Stat. at 211 (“Section 1012(b)(4) of [ISTEA] is amended by striking ‘a pilot program under
this section, but not on more than 3 of such programs’ and inserting ‘any value pricing pilot program under this
subsection’.”).
Beyond the value pricing pilot programs, TEA-21 created the Interstate System reconstruction rehabilitation pilot
program, a limited program that allows for the introduction of new tolls on Interstate Highways “for the purpose of
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Importantly, TEA-21 also expanded the possible purview of value pricing pilot programs
by allowing them to make use of high-occupancy vehicle (“HOV”) lanes. Federal law authorizes
“[a] State agency that has jurisdiction over the operation of a HOV facility shall establish the
occupancy requirements of vehicles operating on the facility,”163 but also directs that, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by this section, no fewer than two occupants per vehicle may be required for
use of a HOV facility.”164 TEA-21 was the first law to eliminate the minimum two-person HOV
vehicle occupancy requirement with respect to value pricing pilot programs.165 This allowed for
“HOT lane” congestion pricing programs that, like the San Diego FasTrak program, allow
vehicles with fewer than the minimal number of occupants otherwise to justify HOV lane access
to purchase access to the HOV lanes.166
ISTEA further spurred state and local governments to consider the implementation of
congestion pricing programs (though not necessarily on Interstate Highways) by directing the
creation of state and local transportation planning units—known as “metropolitan planning
organizations” or “MPOs”167—and by introducing the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality
Improvement Program (“CMAQ Program”).168 MPOs are to develop transportation plans for
urbanized areas,169 with the overall goal of “serv[ing] the mobility needs of people and freight
and foster economic growth and development within and through urbanized areas, while
minimizing transportation-related fuel consumption and air pollution..”170 Among the factors that
MPOs were to consider in develop in generating transportation plans, under the statute as
originally enacted, was “[t]he need to relieve congestion and prevent congestion from occurring
where it does not yet occur.”171 Further, MPOs are to develop long-range transportation plans;172
the original wording of the statute called for MPOs to “recommend[ ] . . . innovative financing
techniques to finance needed projects and programs, including such techniques as . . . tolls and
congestion pricing.”173
TEA-21 revised the statute both to eliminate the mandatory consideration of congestion
relief in developing transportation plans,174 and to delete the express reference to congestion
reconstructing and rehabilitating highway corridors that could not otherwise be adequately maintained or functionally
improved without the collection of tolls.” 23 U.S.C. § 129 note. See generally TEA-21 § 1216(b).
163
23 U.S.C. § 166(a)(1). An earlier version authorized “State transportation department [to] establish the
occupancy requirements of vehicles operating in high occupancy vehicle lanes.” 23 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (repealed
by Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59,
§ 1121(b)(1), 119 Stat. 1144, 1195 (Aug. 10, 2005).
164
23 U.S.C. § 166(a)(2). An earlier version directed that “no fewer than 2 occupants per vehicle may be required.”
23 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (repealed by Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users, Pub. L. 109-59, § 1121(b)(1), 119 Stat. 1144, 1195 (Aug. 10, 2005).
165
TEA-21 § 1216(a)(5), 112 Stat. at 211-12 (amending ISTEA § 1012(b)(6) to read: “Notwithstanding section
146(c) of title 23, United States Code, a State may permit vehicles with fewer than 2 occupants to operate in high
occupancy vehicle lanes if the vehicles are part of a value pricing pilot program under this subsection.”); see Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, § 9006(b), Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (July 22, 1998)
(amending TEA-21 § 1216(a)(5) “by striking ‘146(c)’ and inserting ‘102(a)’”).
166
See supra notes 131, 133, and accompanying text.
167
See ISTEA § 1024(a), 105 Stat. at 1955 (codified, as amended, at 23 U.S.C. § 134).
168
See ISTEA § 1008(a), 105 Stat. at 1932 (codified, as amended, at 23 U.S.C. § 149); The Congestion Mitigation
and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) Program of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act—Guidance
Update, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,890 (1996) [hereinafter “CMAQ Program Guidance Update].
169
23 U.S.C. § 134(a)(2).
170
Id. § 134(a)(1).
171
Id. § 134(f)(2).
172
Id. § 134(g).
173
Id. § 134(g)(2).
174
TEA-21 § 1203(f), 112 Stat. at 174.
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pricing.175 Following amendment by TEA-21, the statute directs that long-range transportation
plans “[a]ssess capital investment and other measures necessary to . . . make the most efficient
use of existing transportation facilities to relieve vehicular congestion and maximize the mobility
of people and goods.”176 Further, the current statute provides, for transportation management
areas—that is, “each urbanized area with a population of over 200,000 individuals”177—that
“transportation planning process . . . include a congestion management system that provides for
effective management of new and existing transportation facilities eligible for funding. . . .”178
The CMAQ Program is designed to encourage transportation planning with an eye not
only to improving efficient transportation, but also to improving air quality. Emissions from
motor vehicles contribute substantially to air pollution, and in particular can be a primary reason
for a region’s inability to comply with national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”)
generated under the federal Clean Air Act.179 The CMAQ Program provides federal funding for
state “transportation projects or programs that will contribute to attainment of the [NAAQS],
primarily for ozone and carbon monoxide.”180 Regulatory guidance indicates that “travel demand
management” is one of the items for which CMAQ Program funds may be made available, and
makes clear that travel demand management includes “road pricing measures.”181
Though value pricing is in its domestic infancy, the Senate in 2004 at one point
contemplated eliminating new value pricing programs. The bill would have repealed the
authorization for new value pricing programs,182 although it would have allowed existing
programs to continue.183 Ultimately, the Congress in August 2005 enacted a new transportation
bill, dubbed the “Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users,”184 or “SAFETEA-LU.” SAFETEA-LU retains the value pricing program.185 It also
establishes an “express lanes demonstration program.”186 The program calls for the establishment
of fifteen toll collection facilities on the interstate system with the purpose of either managing
congestion, reducing emissions levels, or financing roadway expansion.187 The tolls to be charged
in such programs “may . . . var[y] in price according to time of day or level of traffic, as
appropriate to manage congestion or improve air quality.”188 Further, the statute requires, “for
each high occupancy vehicle facility that charges tolls under this subsection, that the tolls vary in
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Id. § 1203(g)(3), 112 Stat. at 174-75.
23 U.S.C. § 134(g)(2)(C)(ii) (2000).
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Id. § 134(i)(1).
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Id. § 134(i)(3).
179
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA must generate NAAQS for so-called constituent pollutants. The states must
then develop “state implementation plans” that are designed to regulate in-state sources in such a way as to achieve
compliance with the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
180
Wahrman, supra note 21, at 188 (footnote omitted).
181
CMAQ Program Guidance Update, supra note 168, at 50,895. See also id. at 50,896 (“The FHWA and FTA
continue to recommend that States and MPOs put together their transportation/air quality programs using
complementary measures that simultaneously provide alternatives to [single-occupancy vehicle] travel while reducing
demand through pricing, parking management, regulatory or other means.”).
182
S. 1072, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1609(c)(1) (Feb. 12, 2004) (“Section 1012 of the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act . . . is amended by striking subsection (b).”).
183
Id. § 1609(c)(2) (“Notwithstanding the amendment made by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall monitor and allow
any value pricing program established under a cooperative agreement in effect on the day before the date of enactment
of this Act to continue.”).
184
Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (Aug. 10, 2005).
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See id. § 1604(a), 119 Stat. at 1249-50.
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See id. § 1604(b), 119 Stat. at 1250-53.
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See id. § 1604(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 1250.
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Id. § 1604(b)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. at 1251.
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price according to time of day or level of traffic, as appropriate to manage congestion or improve
air quality.”189
In sum, while federal funding may be provided for toll roads, the availability of federal
funding for interstate highways—the most important component of the nation’s highway
network—remains quite circumscribed. The value pricing pilot programs present the possibility
of broader use of congestion pricing in the future, although there is some political sentiment to
preclude expansion of such programs.
D. Existing Congestion Pricing Regimes
In this Section, I present a brief survey of some current U.S. congestion pricing
programs.190 At the outset, however, it bears noting that several congestion pricing programs
abroad—including, notably, programs in Singapore, Trondheim, Toronto, and London—have had
considerable success. Moreover, as I have discussed above, the success of one of these
programs—the one in Singapore—is at least somewhat responsible for the increased attention
paid to congestion pricing regimes domestically,191 while the success of another program—the
fledgling program in London192—may bolster prospects for even greater use of congestion pricing
domestically.
Toll roads in New Jersey (the New Jersey Turnpike) and California (the San Joaquin
Hills Toll Road) currently feature congestion pricing.193 In addition, tolls to cross the Hudson
River from New York to New Jersey (via the George Washington Bridge or the Lincoln or
Holland Tunnels), and tolls to cross two bridges in Lee County Florida, are subject to congestion
pricing.194 Plans are being developed to introduce congestion pricing on additional toll roads in
Florida, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio.195
Domestically, interest in and use of lane-pricing access programs is increasing. Express
lanes on an Orange County, California highway are already subject to congestion pricing, and
programs are under development to introduce congestion pricing on lanes in highways in
California, Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.196
Interest in development of HOT lanes is especially intense. Besides the San Diego
FasTrak program, HOT lanes programs are in effect on two highways in Houston, and in
Colorado and Minnesota.197 Proposals to introduce HOT lanes are under development for
highways in California, Florida, Georgia, and Washington,198 and are also being considered for
highways in Maryland and Virginia.199
189

Id. § 1604(b)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. at 1251. The statute further provides that “a State may permit motor vehicles
with fewer than two occupants to operate in high occupancy vehicle lanes as part of a variable toll pricing program
established under this subsection.” Id. § 1604(b)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. at 1251.
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See Federal Highway Administration, List of Projects by Type (available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/projectlist.htm (last modified Aug. 10, 2007)). Note that the projects I summarize
here are a subset of all value pricing programs; some projects (such as projects that involve parking pricing) do not fall
under the rubric of congestion pricing (at least as I use the terminology here).
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See supra text accompanying note 101.
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See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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See Federal Highway Administration, supra note 191.
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See id.
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See id.
196
See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See Editorial: HOT Prospects, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A16.
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No FAIR lanes regimes are currently in use, although plans for FAIR lanes programs are
under development for a highway in California.200 Also, although no cordon pricing regime is in
use domestically, a proposal to subject all East River crossings into and out of New York City’s
Manhattan Island (combined with the existing congestion pricing regime for Hudson River
crossings) would, if implemented, create a de facto cordon pricing regime.201 This year, Mayor
Michael Bloomberg has proposed the introduction of cordon congestion pricing in southern
Manhattan, although the proposal has been somewhat stymied by political opposition.202
E. Economics and Public Choice of Congestion Pricing
The economic underpinnings of congestion pricing are depicted above, in Figure 1.
Essentially, congestion gives rise to an externality because drivers internalize only their own
costs, rather than society’s actual costs. Congestion pricing regimes endeavor to remedy this
situation by requiring drivers to internalize the costs that otherwise would be externalized.203
Congestion pricing results in better allocation of the scarce resource of roadway access. It
also reduces uneconomic overuse of roads. In addition, such programs increases government
coffers through congestion pricing revenue. Further, congestion pricing also “saves society
significant amounts of resources in obviating the establishment and maintenance of an oversized
infrastructure network . . . [, with the] consequence . . . [that] much sought after tax dollars, land
and capital would be released for more socially beneficial tasks.”204
The economic benefits, and likely success, of congestion pricing regimes seem clear.205
But public choice and political economy considerations are not as favorable to congestion pricing
regimes as they are to the provision of new roadway capacity. First, consider that congestion
regimes, unlike roadway capacity responses, do not, at least currently, receive substantial support
from powerful, organized interest groups.206 In particular, the simple imposition of a congestion
charging regime offers politicians no support from the construction industry or its workers. While
there are industries that benefit from implementation of congestion pricing systems—for
example, companies that manufacture the transponders on which many of the systems rely—the
transportation and real estate construction industries seem to offer the promise of more sizeable,
better organized support, perhaps because of the years those industries have had to hone their
lobbying and political relations expertise.207
Second, consider public reaction to proposals to implement congestion pricing. Recall
that public choice theory does not render irrelevant public opinion. Public opinion may matter,
both because the public may somehow may bypass interest groups and make its strong opinion
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See Federal Highway Administration, supra note 191.
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See infra notes 234-241 and accompanying text. See also Marisa Lagos, City Searches for Traffic Innovations,
S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 11, 2005, at 5 (discussing the possibility of a cordon congestion pricing program in San
Francisco).
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See supra notes 56-57, 108, and accompanying text. Note that some commentators do not believe that all
externalized costs should optimally be internalized. See supra note 115.
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Hau, supra note 111, at 224.
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See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1246 (“[I]f current estimates are correct, a national shift to congestion pricing
would generate societal benefits of $5 to $11 billion annually. . . .”).
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But see infra note 243 and accompanying text (noting that some environmental organizations have announced
support of congestion pricing).
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Below, I discuss the possibility that this might change in the future. See infra Part VI.
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know to government actors, or because interest groups may realize that they can tap into latent
public opinion to strengthen their case to legislators.208
In the case, of congestion pricing, there is apparently plenty of latent public opinion into
which to tap. Public reaction to congestion pricing tends to be rather strongly negative. In
particular, the public is doubtful about congestion pricing for several reasons, including concerns
of equity, general opposition to new government fees for items that previously were offered at no
charge, concerns over privacy, and concerns over the appropriateness of using market-based
regimes to achieve environmental goals.209
Equity concerns underlie many objections to the implementation of congestion pricing
programs. First, to the extent that revenue from a program is seen only to fill government coffers,
drivers, and indeed the public at large, may consider the program inequitable. Indeed, absent
revenue recycling (i.e., government use of the money to improve the transport network), “most
travellers will experience net losses as a result of the introduction of road user charging, as for
most people who continue to drive [the] resulting time savings will be less than the road user
charge and so their consumer surplus will be reduced.”210
A second equity-related point is the perceived distributional impact of a congestionpricing regime. The burden of a congestion pricing regime might be seen to fall heavily on poorer
people. In other words, the regime might be characterized as a regressive tax.211 Indeed, an
efficient allocation of a resource may not always be distributionally fair, and the fact that
efficiency should not always be rendered subservient to distributional goals in the transport
setting is clear. Phil Goodwin observes that “there are some transport policies that nobody
suggests should be determined by ‘willingness-to-pay’.”212 As an example, Goodwin points to the
allocation of road space between vehicles and pedestrians, which, he contends, is not seriously
the subject of proposed pricing regimes.213
208

See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
Peter Jones highlights several concerns that the public-at-large tend to express over congestion pricing schemes:
(i) drivers have difficulty accepting a “charge for congestion”; (ii) the belief that urban road pricing is simply
unnecessary; (iii) the belief that congestion pricing will not effectively reduce vehicular travel; (iv) skepticism about
the effectiveness and accuracy of technology underlying congestion pricing; (v) concerns about privacy; (vi) concerns
that a congestion pricing system based upon a particular “urban boundary” may have substantial effects on areas near
that boundary; (vii) public perception of congestion pricing as just another tax; and (viii) the perception that congestion
pricing is, in one way or other, unfair. Jones, supra note 114, at 265-69.
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Peter M. Jones, Road Pricing: The Public Viewpoint, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 29, at 159, 159 (citation
omitted).
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See Jones, supra note 114, at 268 (noting the public perception of congestion pricing regime as “[j]ust [a]nother
[f]orm of [t]axation”).
Lior Strahilevitz compares the San Diego I-15 congestion pricing HOV lane program to a tradable pollution permit
regime. See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1288. However, the structure of the program suggests that it is more similar
to a tax regime, insofar as no “permit” allowing access to the highway express lanes is actually tradable. A modified
system, designed by Peter Jones to address equity concerns, bears greater similarity to a tradable pollution permit
regime:
[C]ar owning residents living within the charged area and other selected population groups might be
given a number of free Travel Units per month (either using smartcard debiting system, or through an account
held by each person). Additional units could be purchased at the standard rate or at a discounted rate (though
in principle there could be differences here according to category of user). By taking the idea further and
making these free Travel Units available to residents (with and without a car) and openly tradeable, then there
would be a further redistribution mechanism from the rich to the poor.
Jones, supra note 114, at 281.
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Goodwin, supra note 115, at 146 (emphasis in original).
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Goodwin elucidates:
An example is the division of road space between vehicles and pedestrians. It would be possible to say that
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Second, to the extent that congestion charges are imposed on roads that previously were
free, they may be perceived as a new tax. Tax increases are never popular, and “[t]here will
inevitably be resistance to paying for something (i.e., road use) which was previously regarded as
free at the point of use . . . .”214 This opposition will be exacerbated to the extent that the revenues
from congestion charging regimes are seen simply to fill government coffers, as explained just
above.
Third, there are concerns about how implementation of congestion pricing would intrude
upon privacy. Many congestion regimes would rely upon technology that could allow
government to track people’s whereabouts.215
Fourth, many people are uneasy, whether rationally or not, about the use of market-based
approaches to regulate the environment.216 And this uneasiness is not absent in the traffic
congestion setting. In the context of a broad 1978 study of people’s reactions to the use of charges
as an environmental regulatory tool, Steven Kelman asked the following question in interviews
with environmentalists:
Let’s say that a parking surcharge developed as part of a transportation control
program reflected the costs a driver imposes on society by driving a car,
including the damages from auto pollution. If the surcharge reflected all such
costs, would you then feel it was OK for a person to drive his car in the city
center as long as he paid the surcharge, or would you still criticize him for not
taking available public transportation?217
Of the environmentalists questioned, “[s]ixty-seven percent . . . said they would still criticize the
car driver . . . .”218
It is possible to address some of these obstacles to implementation of congestion pricing
regimes through education. For example, public concerns about the need for, efficacy, and
general propriety, of congestion pricing regimes might be addressed through education of the
public as to the proper working of the regimes.219
vehicles are willing to contribute, or even more specifically that pedestrian-actuated traffic signals should
require the insertion of a coin. The logic in one sense is similar to that of road pricing, but it does not
command serious consideration. Nor does there exist (as far as I know) an underground of hard-line road
pricers biding their time until the moment is right to implement pedestrian charging with push-chair
supplements and a penalty for elderly slow walkers.
Id. Goodwin’s point clearly has merit, although one might argue that he overstates the case somewhat, in that allocation
of public spaces are in fact sometimes divided among different users when supply of the resource becomes insufficient
to meet overall demand. For example, public spaces in parks are often divided between cyclists and rollerbladers on the
one hand, and pedestrians and joggers on the other.
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Jones, supra note 210, at 159. See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1248 (“Loss-aversion theory tells us that these
types of changes are likely to spark strong opposition. Over the years, commuters will increasingly see themselves as
entitled to use the roadways that their tax dollars helped build and maintain” (footnotes omitted)).
This may be true to a lesser extent for roads which had been flat-rate toll roads but on which a congestion pricing
regime now is superimposed (the George Washington Bridge, for example—see supra text accompanying note 194).
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See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1248-49.
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See generally STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 46-53 (1981).
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Steven Kelman, Economic Incentives and Environmental Policy: Politics, Ideology, and Philosophy, in
INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 291, 314 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983).
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Id.
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Peter Jones argues:
Based on the concerns expressed by the public, it is evident that four general arguments have to be won before
road pricing can be introduced into urban areas with majority public support. Namely that:
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Other obstacles might be addressed through structural design choices. For example,
concerns over privacy could be ameliorated by officially restricting the possible use of
information gathered by virtue of congestion pricing regimes. And the problem of substantial
impact on boundary regions could be addressed by designing regimes that do not rely upon
boundaries as “on/off switches” for the application of congestion pricing.
The “no new tax” objection also can be addressed structurally, by hypothecating the
revenue from the regime—i.e., by promising that the congestion fees gathered will be used in
large measure either to improve the highway or transit system, or to offset some of the
distributional injustices to which the regime might be seen to give rise. Indeed, public support for
congestion pricing schemes jumps substantially when the schemes are said to contemplate
revenue recycling.220 Along the lines of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Twersky’s “prospect
theory”221 and the literature on framing and how mental accounting may affect people’s
perceptions of various choices,222 it may be that people will more readily accept the “loss” of a
“new tax” when they perceive in connection with it a gain in some other area. Another useful
structural step is to make the pricing scheme transparent and understandable;223 this will help
people both to understand and accept the program, and to make wise use of the pricing
information that the program provides in practice.
Revenue recycling is also an important element of insulating congestion pricing regimes
from the charge that they are inequitable. Revenue from congestion charges can be used, for
example, to maintain existing roads, to improve the mass transportation system for drivers who
are priced out of roadway use, or even to subsidize poorer users’ use of restricted roadways.224
Also pertinent to the equity inquiry is whether the advent of congestion pricing leaves reasonable
substitutes available to the public at no charge (or at least at a lesser charge).
In the end, however, the mere fact that some of the public’s objections to congestion
charges might be combated via education (or otherwise) is irrelevant to the public choice
inquiry—irrelevant, that is, unless some interest group or political entrepreneur decides to try to
undertake the necessary education in order to shift public opinion, and then presumably to make
use of the change in public opinion. Thus, even with all these education and design options,
public choice theory predicts that the path to implementation of congestion pricing regimes on a
broad scale appears to remain an uphill one. Most particularly, industry, worker, labor, and

1.
there is a need to take some action to restrain traffic levels;
2.
the alternatives to road pricing are ineffective or insufficient;
3.
road pricing is a practical and effective measure; and
4.
equity concerns can be addressed.
Jones, supra note 114, at 269-70.
220
See Jones, supra note 210, at 168 (“Hypothecating revenues does seem to increase public support [for
congestion pricing systems] considerably – if, as a consequence, improvements in transport systems can be achieved.
People then feel that they are getting something for their money, either through improvements to the road network or in
the alternative methods of travel.”); see id. at 168-70 (presenting survey results validating this proposition).
221
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
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241.
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(therefore) political support remains substantially in favor of the new roadway construction
option.
VI.

ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC CHOICE EVALUATION OF NEW ROADWAY CAPACITY AND
CONGESTION CHARGES

In this Part, I turn to the question of whether economic efficiency or public choice has
greater predictive accuracy in the context of traffic congestion. I earlier showed that generation of
new roadway capacity is likely to be economically inefficient (at least over the long term) but
nonetheless likely at present to receive critical support from a public choice perspective, and also
that congestion charges are more likely to be economically efficient, but less likely at present to
be viable from a public choice perspective.225 Because the provision of new roadway capacity
continues to dominate congestion pricing,226 I have little trouble concluding that the public choice
225

See supra Parts IV, V.
There are other governmental responses to the problem of traffic congestion, none of which has either been used
as extensively as the provision of new roadway capacity, or has the promise of congestion pricing. First, there are
market-based instruments other than congestion pricing. See supra note 89.
Land use planning is another possible response to problems of traffic congestion. Land use regulation generally
occurs at the state, and especially the local, level, although Congress has to a limited extent sought to impose,
indirectly, land use controls on lands near federally-financed highways, through controls on the availability of funds.
For example, the full federal highway funding is conditioned on a state implementing programs to restrict billboard
advertising near highways, see 23 U.S.C. § 131(b), as well as programs to restrict the presence of outdoor junkyards
near highways, see id. § 136(b). Land use planning tends to be particularly dominated in the political arena by powerful
interest groups, especially those who favor development. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the
public choice pressure in favor of development, and therefore generally in opposition to land use restrictions); Buzbee,
supra note 79, at 77-91 (presenting an overview of the political economy of “urban sprawl”). Rarely, moreover, are
land use restrictions used to “undo” development as a way to alleviate traffic congestion. Cf. Michael Janofsky, In
Towns that Slowed Growth, Backlash Stirs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, sec. 1, at 20 (“In Colorado, where the economy
has sagged for two years, several small towns eager to spur development and increase the local tax base are turning
away from growth restrictions.”). Land use restrictions are of little use in combating traffic congestion in the short run.
While they may be used to constrain the further development of congestion in the long run, they are unlikely practically
to offer a complete solution to traffic congestion problems. (I discuss below in this footnote the possible use of impact
fees, which function in connection with land use controls and providing new roadway capacity.)
Another possible governmental response to traffic congestion is behavior modification—that is, attempts by the
government to alter people’s behavior so as to reduce traffic congestion. Often grouped under the title “transportation
demand management” or “TDM,” see, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and
Growth Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Resolving America’s Quality of Life Crisis, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
915, 962-63 (1991) (discussing TDM); Stanley D. Abrams, Implementing the Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance to
Manage Transportation Congestion, SE11 ALI-ABA 595 (1999), such attempts can take different forms. First, the
government might, whether through incentives or simply requests, attempt to induce businesses to stagger working
hours so as to reduce rush hour congestion. For example, the Clean Air Act authorizes states leeway to include in
attainment plans for severe ozone nonattainment areas requirements that may induce employers to stagger working
hours. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d)(1)(B); see also Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional
Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 188-92 (1992)
(critiquing the prior, more exacting version of section 7511a(d)(1)(B) for its erroneous emphasis on vehicle occupancy
as opposed to average ridership); Oren, supra note 31, at 143-45 (describing the short-lived, unsuccessful life of the
prior version of section 7511a(d)(1)(B)); EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 257-69 (presenting an empirical analysis of
worker schedule flexibility). Second, the government might attempt to induce individuals to choose public
transportation over driving as a means of transportation. For example, under the TransitChek program in New York
City, administered by TransitCenter, Inc. (a non-profit corporation), employers give employees funds to pay for mass
transit tax-free; the employers obtain a tax advantage in terms of reduced payroll taxes. See TransitCenter, Inc.,
TransitChek: Company Benefits, www.transitcenter.com/benefits/tc_co/overview.htm (visited Dec. 3, 2005). (Note,
however, that the absence of congestion pricing regimes on highways may necessitate greater subsidization of mass
transit. See supra note 63.) Third, the government might restrict access to certain lanes to automobiles that are occupied
by a certain minimum number of persons (so-called “high-occupancy vehicle” or “HOV” lanes, or “carpool” lanes);
government might also arrange for meeting points to reduce transactions costs of forming a carpool.. Fourth, the
government might provide information about traffic congestion, allowing individual users to take that information into
account in plotting their travel routes, with the possibility of overall reductions in congestion. See generally EMMERINK,
226
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supra note 64, at 9-34. Behavioral modification approaches run into the entrenched American cultural ideal of driving a
vehicle. See supra note 80 (discussing the importance to Americans of driving vehicles, and surveying how that ideal
has frustrated attempts to change driving patterns through behavioral modification). Cf. David W. Dunlap, Planner
Seek More Streets Through Trade Center Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at B3 (“One of the underlying principles [of
the plan to open more streets to traffic at the former World Trade Center site] is that streets work better when they are
filled with cars and trucks. In contrast, pedestrian-only zones, which were once a favored device of planners, can
sometimes seem lifeless.”). For this reason, behavioral modification that is not directly supported by adequate monetary
incentives is unlikely to succeed in substantially ameliorating traffic congestion.
Government might take a more forceful hand in trying to achieve behavioral modification by enacting programs
that (at least facially) mandate changes in people’s driving behavior. Among these “command-and-control”
approaches—so-called because the government centrally commands and controls societal actors’ behavior—are the
establishment of parking controls, the promotion of employer-based mandatory trip reduction programs, and the
implementation of an “odds and evens” license plate vehicle authorization system. Hau, supra note 111, at 223.
Command-and-control regimes remain the dominant form of domestic environmental regulation, despite intense
criticism of such regimes from the academy. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21, 24-25 (2001). Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of command-and-control
regulation is that it unnecessarily deprives societal actors of flexibility in complying with governmental goals. See id.;
Nash, supra note 89, at 486. This lack of flexibility means that societal actors will have to engage in particular behavior
to comply with the government mandate even if other behavior would be less onerous and costly and still achieve the
government’s goal. Similar criticism can be lodged against command-and-control approaches in the congestion context.
Such approaches also unnecessarily restrain societal actors’ flexibility. See Hau, supra note 111, at 223 (comparing
command-and-control approaches to “market-based measures” that “permit[ ] motorists the maximum flexibility of
choosing when, where and by what mode they desire to travel”). As Timothy Hau explains, “command and control
measures that take aim at altering motorists’ travel behavior all impose a great deal of inconvenience and costs – both
explicit and implicit.” Id. Moreover, even putting these points to the side, it is unclear how successful behaviorallymotivated command-and-control regulation can be in the congestion context. As explained above, the individual’s
attitude that driving is a right is quite robust. While one would expect a mandatory program—backed up by
government sanction—to be more successful than a non-coercive program to the same effect, nonetheless one might
question just how successful such a program might be. Cf. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231,
1295-96 (2001) (drawing on empirical evidence to conclude that the degree to which recycling behavior is convenient
may encourage the behavior more than a social norm in favor of the behavior).
Yet another response to congestion is to invoke market-based measures to attack the congestion problem
indirectly—i.e., other than directly through the use of a mechanism like congestion pricing that uses market mechanics
directly to affect traffic congestion levels. Indirect market-based measures include annual vehicle license fees, gasoline
taxes, and setting economic parking charges and parking taxes. Hau, supra note 111, at 224. While indirect marketbased approaches will have some effect on congestion, the fact that they are not focused directly on congestion, and do
not compel internalization of congestion costs, means that they will not be efficient at attaining congestion goals.
Consider first the option of annual vehicle license fees. Such fees are generally quite low, and would have to be raised
significantly to have any effect on vehicle ownership and, therefore, roadway usage. Moreover, even if these fees were
increased substantially, still they would represent merely a periodic (though hefty) charge; the fee would not be tied to
roadway usage. Thus, one would expect that, once someone made the decision to incur the fee, that person would have
no disincentive against engaging in inefficient travel. Hau, supra note 111, at 224.
Much like annual vehicle fees, gasoline tax rates in the United States are generally too low to have any substantial
effect on roadway usage. But, even putting that to the side, “[i]ncreases in gasoline taxes . . . affect only the amount of
travel and are ineffective in dealing with congestion whenever and wherever it occurs.” Id. Accord Jerry L. Mashaw,
The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Concerning Federally Aided Highway
Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 74 n.247 (1973).
Parking fees are more closely tied to roadway usage than either vehicle fees or gasoline taxes. But still the
relationship is too tenuous to guarantee an appropriate and full effect on traffic congestion. See Hau, supra note 111, at
224; Mashaw, supra, at 74 n.247. Further, “parking charges based on time can operate to increase congestion by
promoting a more rapid turnover of cars.” Mashaw, supra, at 74 n.247. Still, the introduction of parking charges should
have some ameliorative effect on traffic congestion. See id. (“[T]o the extent that parking charges which reflect the real
costs of street use in particular areas would deter motorists from driving and encourage transfer to public transport or
fringe parking, these charges would be beneficial in allocating resources to higher value users.”). However, because
parking charges alone are unlikely to address the congestion problem in its entirety, parking charges ideally “should be
used along with other pricing techniques.” Id.
Another indirect market-based mechanism is the use of impact fees imposed on land developers to finance road
construction and maintenance. Impact fees are imposed, generally by local governments, on developers, with the funds
received used to finance public service infrastructure needs, e.g., James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer,
Market Based Approaches to Environmental Preservation: To Environmental Mitigation Fees and Beyond, 43 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 837, 843 (2003), including transportation services, e.g., id. at 844 (identifying “[t]transportation services
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story has greater weight at present. I then consider whether the slight movement toward greater
acceptance of congestion pricing might signal a weakening in the public choice explanation and a
strengthening of the efficiency story. The movement can also be explained on public choice
grounds, however. Moreover, the particular contexts in which much of the movement toward
congestion pricing is occurring suggest that it is a shift in the relevant interest groups and public
opinion, and not a shift in explanatory story, that underlies the movement toward greater
acceptance of congestion pricing.
Because, at present, the efficiency story predicts an increased reliance on property rights
through congestion pricing regimes, while the public choice story does not, the traffic congestion
setting provides a natural one in which to measure the predictive accuracy of the stories. As I
noted above, the generation of new roadway capacity remains the dominant government response
to the problem of traffic congestion. The absence of the emergence of property rights—through
the implementation of congestion pricing regimes or otherwise—strongly suggests, in turn, that
the public choice story for the evolution of property rights dominates the efficiency story.
But there are signs that the dominance of new roadway capacity may be fading, at least
somewhat. Even if it remains quite popular and even though opposition to congestion charges
remains strong, the fact is that recent years have seen an increase in the implementation of
congestion pricing regimes, with even more regimes in the planning stages.227
The shift, albeit perhaps comparatively small at this juncture, suggests that the traditional
dominance of the public choice story is weakening. And, indeed, one might argue that, as traffic
congestion has continued to worsen—that is, as the size of the externality has grown—so, too, has
pressure grown on government actors to respond to the problem in a more efficient way. And,
indeed, this accords with the understanding that the strength of the efficiency story increases as
the size of the externality increases.228 In addition, the efficiency story predicts an increase in
property rights as the cost of delineating property rights drops.229 And, indeed, the move toward
congestion prices corresponds to drops in the cost of transponders technology and in the time
necessary to collect congestion-varied tolls.
With respect to the decrease in influence of the public choice story, one might argue that
road construction was popular among large, powerful interest groups, and they simply co-opted
the congestion problem as yet another justification for road construction. But once the congestion
such as highways and bridges [as] the [second] most common type of impact fee”). See Gregory M. Parkhurst & Jason
F. Shogren, Evaluating Incentive Mechanisms for Conserving Habitat, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1139 n.266 (2003)
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RESOURCES J. 887 (2003) (discussing the design of impact fees in the Albuquerque metropolitan area). The fees can be,
and often generally are, set by reference to the marginal increase in demand for services to which the developer’s action
ultimately will give rise. Cf. Nick Rosenberg, Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost Internalization
Actually Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641 (2003) (discussing development impact fees as a means of
internalizing cost). Impact fees do force internalization of some congestion-related costs, but it is developers, not
roadway users, on whom internalization is imposed. See supra note 89 (discussing the environmental law’s “polluter
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problem becomes “too large,” the arguments in favor of road construction face competition from
economic pressure for a “real” solution to traffic congestion.
That political opposition to congestion pricing remains robust even in the face of strong
efficiency pressures to implement such regimes cannot be doubted. First, although it was not
enacted in that form—the fact that, at this late date and despite the success of pilot congestion
pricing programs—a bill was considered in the Senate that would have curtailed pilot congestion
pricing programs.230
Second, if one had to identify a setting in the United States in which congestion pricing
would face the least opposition, it would probably be New York City. Politically, the city tends to
be quite liberal (at least compared to the rest of the United States),231 which suggests that one
might expect less opposition to congestion pricing on the ground that it imposes a new tax.232
Nowhere else in the United States, moreover, is reliance upon public transit more possible or
more strongly engrained and accepted by the populace.233 And the city suffers from tremendous
traffic woes.
Even in New York City, however, it has taken Mayor Michael Bloomberg years formally
to advance a congestion pricing proposal, the fate of which even now remains uncertain. The
mayor initially backed away from a proposal to implement a proposal to charge vehicles that
enter Manhattan Island,234 and this year finally proposed a cordon pricing scheme for traffic
entering Manhattan south of 86th Street.235 The plan was received enthusiastically by New York
State Governor Eliot Spitzer (at least initially) and the U.S. Department of Transportation.236 Still,
political opposition from the “outer boroughs”—that is, those areas of the city where public
transit is less accessible and commutes on public transit are longer237—is strong.238 Further, state
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legislators, who had to approve the plan, were tempered239; State Assembly Speaker Sheldon
Silver was critical of the proposal.240 In the end, all that the Mayor has thus far been able to
accomplish is the appointment of a commission to examine ways to reduce traffic congestion,
including the possibility of congestion pricing.241 Thus, political power continues to dog
efficiency concerns, even in New York City.
The continued strength—and success—of political opposition to congestion pricing
suggests that congestion pricing will emerge not only when congestion becomes bad enough that
efficiency concerns become too great to ignore, but also when political interests align behind
congestion pricing. Thus, to the extent that there is a shift toward greater implementation of
congestion pricing, it is simply the strength of the relevant interest group players, and perhaps
public opinion, that is shifting. First, consider the possibility that support for congestion pricing
among reasonably powerful interest groups may be growing. As transponder technology
continues to flourish generally with respect to toll collection, the transponder industry will
continue to grow. And, over time, there is likely to be greater interest on the part of the
transponder industry to lobby for expanded use of transponders, including through
implementation of congestion pricing regimes. In addition, while they remain divided on the
question,242 some environmental groups have endorsed the use of congestion charges.243 It is
possible that these groups have offset somewhat the traditional interest group opposition to
congestion charging in favor of new roadway capacity; indeed, they may even have used—or
may use in the future—education to try to sway public opinion in favor of congestion charges.244
This accords well with President Bush’s decision to appoint a Transportation Secretary who
favors expansion of congestion pricing.245
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The location of the current frontier for congestion pricing lends credence to the continued
strength of the public choice story. Other than major metropolitan areas, like London and New
York, where the congestion externality has worsened and the possibility of introducing new roads
is practically impossible, congestion pricing has emerged (to the extent it has emerged at all) in
three basic settings: roadways (or bridge or tunnel portions of roadways) that already were subject
to tolling, new roadways, new lanes on existing roadways, and HOT lanes.246 The fact that
congestion pricing has begun to take hold in these contexts conforms to public choice predictions,
on several grounds. First, the implementation of a congestion pricing regime on a new road—or
on new lanes on an existing road—is not likely to be seen as the imposition of a fee for something
that previously was provided for free. Thus, public opposition to congestion pricing under such
conditions is less intense.247
Second, the fact that new roadway construction will be undertaken means that the support
of the transportation and real estate construction industries, their workers, and organized labor
should in large measure persist. Congestion pricing would be seen as part-and-parcel with new
roadway construction, rather than as a competitor to it.
Third, the fact that only new roadway capacity is to be subject to congestion pricing
means that preexisting capacity will remain open to the public at no charge. This will blunt
concerns, and objections, about the equitable impact of congestion charging, for there will remain
options not subject to congestion pricing that drivers can use.248
Fourth, it may be that greater public interest in environmental goals will spur support for
congestion pricing. Congestion pricing may be seen to be consistent with environmentalism.
Support for congestion pricing may increase substantially to the extent that environmental
organizations come to accept the use of market-based mechanisms.249
VII.

CONCLUSION

In this Paper, I have considered the responses that the two economic explanations for the
emergence of property rights—the efficiency and public choice stories250—predicted in response
to scarcity in the resource of roadway access. I demonstrated that, of the two primary
governmental responses to the problem of traffic congestion, one—the generation of roadway
capacity—is currently favored by the public choice story for the evolution of property rights,
while the other—congestion charges—is currently preferred by the efficiency story. While
congestion pricing is an attractive means by which to combat traffic congestion from an economic
perspective, implementation of such regimes is today hindered by their general inability to garner
political support. In contrast, the provision of new roadway capacity, while likely ineffective—
and perhaps even detrimental—from an efficiency perspective, is likely at present to be a
successful strategy in the political arena. I also speculated that, while a slight movement toward
246
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greater acceptance of congestion pricing might signal that the efficiency story has overtaken the
public choice story in terms of explanatory power, the better explanation is that it is instead the
public choice inputs, and not the explanatory paradigm, that have shifted.
The relative explanatory power of the two stories in the context of traffic congestion
provides insight into the more general question of the relative strength of the efficiency and
public choice accounts for the development of property rights. The case of traffic congestion
strongly suggests that the public choice account has greater predictive accuracy than does the
efficiency account, at least at comparatively low levels of resource use congestion. At higher
levels of resource use congestion, it appears that greater pressure appears to move toward a more
efficient regime. Even then, however, it seems that public choice at least controls the specific
nature of the shift toward greater efficiency, if indeed it does not control the shift entirely.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Jonathan Remy Nash
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
jnash@uchicago.edu

Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice

45

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–299 please go to Working Papers at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006)
Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols (August 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006)
Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (September 2006)
Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006)
M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs
Are Low (September 2006)
Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance
(September 2006)
Randal C. Picker, Who Should Regulate Entry into IPTV and Municipal Wireless? (September
2006)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September 2006)
David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006)
Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution
(October 2006)
Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors
Pay Less? (November 2006)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law (November
2006)
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth without Markets? (November 2006)
Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (December 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (December
2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and
Commutations (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to
Habermas) (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Completely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007)
Albert H. Choi and Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (January 2007)
Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007)
Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable
Accommodation, Balancing and Stigmatic Harms (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007)
David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and
Doctrine in the Corporate Tax (January 2007)
Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comments on “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design” (January 2007)
Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal
(January 2007)
Randal C. Picker, Pulling a Rabbi Out of His Hat: The Bankruptcy Magic of Dick Posner
(February 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic (Libertarian)
Authoritarian (February 2007)

Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

46

Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? (February
2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For (March 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution.
Part II: State Level Analysis (March 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act (March 2007)
M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps (March 2007)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive (April 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses (May 2007)
Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities (June 2007)
David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us about Taxation? (June 2007)
David S. Abrams and Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the
Philadelphia Bail Experiment (June 2007)
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
(June 2007)
Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posners, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis (July 2007)
Daniel Kahneman and Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (July 2007)
Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions (July 2007)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns (July 2007)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination (July 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela Gross,
Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation,
Governmentality, and Race (July 2007)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try This at Home”: Posner as Political Economist (July 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the United States
(August 2007)
David S. Abrams and Marianne Bertrand, Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race? (August
2007)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice (August 2007)
David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities (August 2007)
David S. Abrams, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration using
Sentencing Enhancements (August 2007)
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (August 2007)
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, Consuption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income
Taxation (September 2007)
Dougals G. Baird and M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money (September 2007)
William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Causation in Tort: General Populations vs. Individual
Cases (September 2007)
Richard McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (September 2007)
Richard McAdams, Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v. Hollingsworth (September
2007)
M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent (October
2007)
Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (October 2007)
David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity (October 2007)
Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0 (October 2007)
Jonathan R. Nash and Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review (October 2007)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review (November 2007)
Anup Malani, Maciej F. Boni, Abraham Wickelgren, and Ramanan Laxminarayan, Controlling
Avian Influenza in Chickens (November 2007)
Richard H. McAdams, The Economic Costs of Inequality (November 2007)

Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice

371.
372.
373.
374.

47

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information
(November 2007)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism (December 2007)
M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge V. Ford Motor
Company (December 2007)
Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in
Road Traffic (December 2007)

